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  individuation of conceptual interest
gary e. davis
April 21, 2017
 


The legacy of life—bios of biology—is eonic, obviously. But I’ll not tarry now with large numbers. (You know the adage: If the genealogy of life were a 24-hour clock, the entire legacy of humanity—paleo-, millions of back, to now—would occupy some last seconds.)

The -ology was emergent, evolutionary—but it wasn’t a genesis, because the latter conception presumes an origin (in terms of which later phenomena can be understood comprehensively), which—in evolution—is never essentially available in terms of precursors: Self-formatively emergent biology isn’t reducible to physics. Selformativity (for short) of intelligence isn’t reducible to what neuroscience studies. Self-enhancive human mentability isn’t a mere subspecies of primate mentability. And insightfulness of high creativity isn’t merely a hybrid novelty.

A good shorthand rubric for Deep Time expressed in high individuation might seem to be the notion in bioscience of “evo-devo” conditions of life. But that phenotypic notion doesn’t provide resourcefulness for understanding talented human individuation. Scaled up to anthropological proportions, the correlate claim (that I would defend) is that a literature comprehending the Selformativity of humanity (vast as this is) doesn’t provide resourcefulness for understanding Homo prospectus as evolving selves that we can be.

Ontogeny of any mind (details of which we never know!) tropes an evolutionarity of humanity—ultimately, evolving conceptuality—which is “Ontogenic” of intelligibility as such. In other words, individuated capability for intelligibility is anthropologically Ontogenic, but irreducible to phenotypic modeling. A modest neologism for this might well be the rubric inteligability of individuation.

Yet, bioscience is an intimate of literary tropography, as any biologist readily shows in their inspired engagements. One might be amazed by the responsiveness of plants to light, as if reaching around shadowed spots to get the most light it can—as if having ability (“...it can”) of intentionality (“reaching”).

Yet, how far it is—an eternity!, we might as well say—from their receptiveness and responsiveness to our receptiveness to their presence (to us) and our responsiveness to their potential for our satisfaction—and derivatively grant to them their own “satisfactions.”

Receptiveness and responsiveness—opening, granting (like a flower) and bearing, coming to fruition, like a seed—phenomenality then read by the ecology, by mentoring, by inspiration, by the times—belongs to all life.

Members of a garden know nothing, yet do “know” their best way, to we who can grant knowing to leafy stems and posit a solidarity of pleasure in there being life, their “enjoyment” and ours, like wrens flittering around branches perfectly, taking a split second to know what’s what here, then there, then awing, gone, as if in perpetual ecstasis, refined over eons to be their kind of happiness.

In the end, essentially speaking, that’s the whole story: one’s kind of happiness—one’s work, one’s witness, one’s legacy as an Earthling of a star that is not eternal, of a biopsychality that is singularly planetary, an intelligence of Earth evincing inteligabilities that can appreciate being. Like leafy stems, like persons in a savannah, one stands for an integrity of being.

That can be articulated to whatever degree—researched, modeled, troped into constellations of insight, conceptualized (proffered to have relatively comprehensive cogency that may serve future inquiry), and presented for ones to come (hoping, if not betting on, durability of one’s work). Generalities of process—creative, scientific, artistic—can be derived.

What best names that estate of engagement, such that the notion of research enterprise, let’s say, pertains to Literary work as cogently as to empirical work? Beyond 20th century conceptions of philosophy, do we no longer call such work “philosophy”?

Anyway, philosophy always was (originally, all the way to recently) a profusion of confused differences between pedagogy for sophisticating and sophisticating inquiry—at once a sanctifiction of giving and gaining.

Yet, how does love of Sophia relate to love of Logia? Is not philology really the better name for love of conceptual inquiry? And philosophy, as such, is derivative teaching? After all, neither philosophy nor philology are aptly characteried as sciences. We know that historically love of Sophia became love of Logos (as “philosophy” longed to capture The Logos of “the” universe). Then science found its ownmost epistemic regioning, and philosophy actually became conceptual philology (though still longing to be science, as in formal metaphysicalism, which is actually lovely poetics).

In any case, discovery and origination in all arts and all sciences share presumptions of high capability (or devotions to supporting instillations of high capability). Educational psychology, then philosophical psychology want to comprehend what’s general to all discovery and origination: high capability for inquiry—high capability to be fruitfully possessed by a body of incongruous influences “wanting” for new coherence modeling; and high capability for formulating new insights.

How does talent individuate into fruitful creativity? What’s the “nature” of creative inteligability? Does the estate of interdomainal endeavor call for modes of thinking that are at once evidentiary (cognitive-scientifically contemporary), philological (in a 21st century sense), and inquirial in some unnamed sense (prior to educational “philosophy” that no longer tries to be science as it mediates “philology21” for ones to come)?


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