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  the Work of generative consilience irt
discursive presentation

gary e. davis
August 26, 2017
 


“Generative consilience” is a notion that I won’t presently define exactly. I’ll pose
the rubric as an emblem for a long-term result of (a) conceptual adventuring; (b) forming a complex of topics having centripetal main concepts (“master concepts,”
I’ll call them) which are understood across topics congruently; and (c) intra-topical complexes of themes that are consistently regarded across topics. I’ve called this process of inquiry (a) prospecting, (b) modeling, and (c) constellating of the Work.
It wouldn’t likely make much sense as such to another reader because it’s not intended as presentation.


an exemplarity of Heidegger

For example, a philosophical scholar may claim that Heidegger’s Con-tributions to Philosophy can be found to be altogether coherent; but finding that wasn’t Heidegger’s intention. He composed it for himself. Likewise with The Event. (Besides, how does one certify that found coherence isn’t basically mirroring one’s own level of comprehensibility that’s not Heid-egger’s sense of what he’s doing? This commonly happens with dismissive scholars who find invalidational coherence readily. But that’s actually projective identification, in the symptomatic sense.) Accurately discerning what Heidegger thought he was doing in texts that were not intended for other readers would make one among (his phrase) “the few and the rare” (which was not an elitist comment).

The Work provides bases for focal discourses, which Heidegger com-monly understood throughout his career—a distinction first thematized, evidently, in 1930, “Essence of Truth,”as the difference between
(a) “setting forth”— the Work, in my idiom—and (b) “setting up”—
a discourse, which has a particular audience and occasion in mind
(e.g., lecture course, essay, or public lecture).

I only mention Heidegger here because he provides a good example of what I’m distinguishing: between (a) the Work and (b) discourse
in light of it.




Calling formation of the Work “philogenic joy” (end of “23 Give me odysseys...”)
may have seemed frivolous, but making creative process thematic for conceptual work is just (at least) to make genesis integral to what the Work is, thus relevant to what a later discourse’s background really is. Analogously, theorizing creativity might aspire to exemplify its subject—what Heidegger called “showing in saying” (Saying) or having performative intimacy with what’s performed. Having only the author appreciate that is no fault of the Work which precedes discursive presentation.

That’s different from interest in genealogical reconstruction after resultant present-ation. Given a distinction between the Work and discourse in light of that (a hermen-eutical derivative of the Work, relative to anticipated audience), genealogy of the discourse would involve surmising how the Work formed itself and how a herm-eneutical transposition into appropriate discursive presentation was done. The author of the discourse is in a better position to speak about that than a scholar, of course; but it’s usually scholarship that has interest in such reconstruction. (A great example is Theodore Kisiel’s The Genesis of Being and Time [1993]).

Anyway, grandly reconstructive scholarship toward conceptual work is going to be basically conceptual, too. Yet, the conceptuality of interdomainal Work isn’t going
to evaluatively fit into any one standard domain. Aspiring to call the Work “philo-sophical” only tropes the historical longing of philosophy to be foundational in meta-physicalist senses. The conceptuality of the Work is Itself (when resulting from interdomainal gravity)—readily interpretable from domainal perspectives; but also possibly in question of those privileges of perspectivity, implicit to the interdomainal interests of the Work.

More specifically: A constitutive engagement with the formation of synergistic master concepts (high centripetalities of tropicality) that continue to individuate relative to other works comprises a kind of conceptual prospecting that may be defined no better than by the Work Itself. (The Work I have in mind is far beyond a proximal distinc-tion between c-conceptuality and t-conceptuality.)

When the Work is transposed (“set up,” enstanced) into cogent, focal discourse, there’s an appropriation that the author hopes will be efficacious, eventually. But
the integrity of the Work is its generativity for later discursive appropriation.

Scholarship about such discourse (i.e., discourse having a non-presentational basis) that seeks to find constitutivity in the subtext or deep structure of the discourse itself likely conceals the “genetic” character of hermeneutical transposition (or trans-lation) resulting in the discourse. This is vastly “validated” by the common reality that an author’s discourse is understood relative to its own discernible implicature, not relative to a formative process which is integral to understanding the basis of the discursive presentation. But that commonality is like presuming the tenability of logocentrism (synchronic) for endeavoring to understand a dynamic lattice (dia-chronic). It’s like an architect thinking about a living net floating in the ocean. Cultural topographies are living nets. Inquiring into the hills’ self-rising and down river efficacies (so to speak) would be topogenic. Inquiring into a topography’s relationship to its topogeny would be topological—analogously as inquiring into
a phenomenality’s genesis (phenomenogeny) is phenomenological.



Why not prospect some vast philological enterprises where wholly enthralling communion of the best engagements may gain generative lastingness?

Have the highest mindal fun imaginable. Make interdomainal gatherings play into the most concentrated (rigouously focused) association possible, whose appellant co-hering may become highly generative for later discursive efficacy.



 


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