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  the Work of generative consilience irt
discursive presentation

gary e. davis
August 26, 2017
May 25, 2018
 


“Generative consilience” is a notion that I won’t presently define exactly. I’ll pose
the rubric as an emblem for a long-term result of (a) conceptual adventuring; (b) forming a complex of topics having centripetal main concepts (“master concepts,”
I’ll call them) which are understood across topics congruently; and (c) intra-topical complexes of themes that are consistently regarded across topics. I’ve called this process of inquiry (a) prospecting, (b) modeling, and (c) constellating of the Work.
It wouldn’t likely make much sense as such to another reader because it’s not intended as presentation.


an exemplarity of Heidegger

For example, a philosophical scholar may claim that Heidegger’s Con-tributions to Philosophy can be found to be altogether coherent; but finding that wasn’t Heidegger’s intention. He composed it for himself. Likewise with The Event. (Besides, how does one certify that found coherence isn’t basically mirroring one’s own level of comprehensibility that’s not Heidegger’s sense of what he’s doing? This commonly happens with dismissive scholars who find invalidational coherence readily. But that’s actually projective identification, in the symptomatic sense.) Accurately discerning what Heidegger thought he was doing in texts that were not intended for other readers would make one among “the few and the rare” (his phrase, which wasn’t an elitist comment).

The Work provides bases for focal discourses, which Heidegger com-monly understood throughout his career—a distinction first thematized, evidently, in 1930, “Essence of Truth,”as the difference between
(a) “setting forth”— the Work, in my idiom—and (b) “setting up”—
a discourse, which has a particular audience and occasion in mind
(e.g., lecture course, essay, or public lecture).

I only mention Heidegger here because he provides a good example of what I’m distinguishing: between (a) the Work and (b) discourse
in light of it.




Calling formation of the Work “philogenic joy” (end of “23 Give me odysseys...”)
may have seemed frivolous, but making creative process thematic for conceptual work is just (at least) to make genesis integral to what the Work is, thus relevant to what a later discourse’s background really is. Analogously, theorizing creativity might aspire to exemplify its subject—what Heidegger called “showing in saying” (Saying) or having performative intimacy with what’s performed. Yet, no one except the author will likely appreciate the relationship between Work and derivative discursive presentation.

That difference is different from interest in genealogical reconstruction after resultant presentation. Given a distinction between the Work (surmised by scholarship or authorial reflection) and discourse in light of the Work (a hermeneutical derivative of the Work, relative to anticipated audience), then genealogy of a topical discourse would involve surmising how the Work formed itself, different from how its derivative discourse was formed, i.e., how a hermeneutical transposition of the Work into appropriate discursive presentation was derived. The author of the discourse is in a better position to speak about that than a scholar, of course; but it’s usually scholarship that has interest in such reconstruction. (A great example is Theodore Kisiel’s The Genesis of Being and Time [1993], which Heidegger would have had good reason to regard dismissively).

A constitutive engagement with the formation of synergistic master concepts (high centripetalities of tropicality) that continue to individuate relative to other works comprises a kind of conceptual prospecting that may be defined no better than by the Work Itself. (The Work I have in mind is far beyond a proximal distin-tion between c-conceptuality and t-conceptuality.) Grandly reconstructive scholarship about conceptual work is going to be basically conceptual, too.

But singular conceptuality of interdomainal Work isn’t going to reconstructively fit into any standard domain. Aspiring to call the philogenic Work “philosophical” only tropes the historical longing of education (philo-sophy) to derive from unified foundations that are meta-physicalist, i.e., constitutive in some Originist, in-principle-Given sense (which self-conceals Our open-ended, evolving capacity for conceptual prospecting). The conceptuality of the Work I anticipate is Itself (resulting from interdomainal gravity of inquirial prospecting)—readily interpretable from domainal perspectives; but interdomainal inquiry implicitly questions canons of perspectivity (i.e., domainities). Trans-domainal potentials of inquiry are integral to conceptual prospecting (which may be essentially philogenic).

When the Work is derivatively transposed (“set up,” enstanced) into cogent, focal discourse, there’s an appropriation that the author hopes will be efficacious, eventually. But the integrity of the Work is its generativity of Itself, not yet anticipating later appropriability.

Scholarship about such Work that seeks to find constitutivity in the subtext or deep structure likely conceals the “genetic” character of the Work which also embodies its potential for hermeneutical transposition (or translation) resulting in topical discourse. This is vastly “validated” by the common reality that an author’s discourse is understood by scholarship relative to its own discernible implicature (i.e.,finding authorship “in” the text), not relative to the self-formative authoriality which is the basis of that available presentation open to discernible authorship (which can then be “contained” by intellectual biography).

Commonly in scholarship, no difference between discerned authorship and its “genetic” authoriality is intimated, let alone addressed. Reconstructed genealogy of authorial career by intellectual biography is supposed to capture the authoriality of discernible authorship. (For example, the “Heidegger” of works, considered cumulatively, is supposed to disclose the authoriality of his Work, the wayfaring generativity that derives works.)

But generalized authorship is a product of conceptual prospecting. Not distinguishing authoriality from authorship betrays desire for logocentrism (synchronic) about a dynamic (which is more than diachronic, a reconstructive notion). Concealing the difference is like pretending to be an architect when thinking about a living net floating in the ocean. But that’s not to say that prospecting generativity is fruitless. Cultural topographies are living nets, yet prospecting the life of that (as if it’s a singularity) is fruitful. Inquiring into hills’ self-rising and down river efficacies would be about topogenic processes, yet geological dynamics can be fruitfully prospected. Inquiring into a topography’s relationship to its topogeny results in topological work—analogously as inquiring into a phenomenality’s genesis (phenomenogeny) is phenomenological. Yet, the inquiring may also prospect itself, commonly done in philosophy of science and art. Philogeny lives in terms of conceptual, philological fruitfulness.



Why not prospect some vast philological enterprise where wholly enthralling communion of the best engagements may be generative?

Of course. That’s what philology was and, after metaphysicalism (after “Philosophy”), may become of conceptual prospecting: post-metaphysicalist philology—21st century philology, Philology21.

Why not. Have the highest mindal fun imaginable. Make interdomainal gatherings play into the most concentrated (rigorously focused) tropology possible, whose appellant co-hering may become highly generative for later discursive sharing (conceptual literary studies?) and efficacy (philo-sophy) for contributing to high individuation of new potential.



 


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