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preface to rendering a conception of “mind” in nature
november 6, 2011 / may 25, 2012


Wondering about the nature of “mind” is clearly a philosophical venture, no matter how scientifically informed.

And growing one’s mentability to an era of life that finds such wonder constructively interesting is a long road.

What is ontogeny of mentability that conceptual wonder presumes?

What is the nature of conceptuality?

Synchronically thinking about mind-brain relations (normal philosophy of mind) hides the ontogenic reality of thinking differentiated relations (the temporally-constitutive conditions for the possibility of highly conceptual differencing—much more than mere diachronic modeling).

Though I concur with inquirers (philosophers, cognitive theorists, etc.) who would endorse saying that “the mind is what the brain does” (analogously as digestion is what the stomach does, according to John Searle), the locus of such an assertion pertains to infancy much more than to highly-adult inquiry, which is so much a highly-developed result of learning and recursive ontogenesis within receding horizons of earlier mental life (which remain horizonal for the limits of understanding).

I don’t think of easily-attentive mental events as directly emergent from neuropsychological processes, due to the ontogenic distance between mental capability formation (neuropsychological) and the high level of mindal reflectivity that conceptual analysis of mind is. The ontogeny of high capability (which is highly internal to the ecology of individuated mentability) distances well-formed attention from the more-directly neuropsychological background of capability formation. This is what I will show (“argue”) in an extensive way, in the coming year or so, among other interests I want to elaboratively share.

Though an epiphenomenality of attention-accessible mental events isn’t synchronically plausible, it seems to me evident as distantly and highly developed (temporally mediated) mental time-space (within recursively receding horizons of earlier development as the background of phenomenality). Any plausible locus of self-identityseems highly derivative (discursive: phenomenological “and” distantly—inferentially—neuropsychological) relative to a highly-developed (individuated) capability for synergistic conceptuality whose potential cohering is figurative (trOpical) of its genesis, as any given act implicitly “stands for” the enacting which brought it to givenness. (By the way, I have no interest in connoting any promise for metaphysicalism, let alone some Absolute Concept.)

“Mind” is a conception of self-identifying comprehensiveness, expressing thereby what our evolving minds highly want to do: find cohering (of self, world, self-worlding—even conceiving in itself)—implicitly (yet very elusively) relative to a highly diachronic (reconstructively “evo-devo”) vortexing or living, enactive phenotype of epigenetic and ontogenic formation of mentability (i.e., a high individuation of conceptuality). Conceptual inquiry is a highly mental time-space internal to a long-developed sensibility.

In the following pages of “biomindality,” I’ll render a narrative landscape, anticiapting later exploration in detail (relative to others’ research), as I’m now generally wanting to merely emphasize that my approach to high individuation and mind is ultimately “natural” (in an essentially-human sense of our nature).

I want to move relatively quickly (sharing a relatively short conceptual story—relative to the scale of my interest or project) toward furthering my sense of high individuation itself (autotelic mind) in a general inquirial sense (not wishing to do conceptual autobiography). I’m confining myself to an emblematic discussion, not pretending to yet be delving into details of others’ researches.

Next: section 2 of “biomindality.”


  Be fair. © 2017, gary e. davis