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gary e. davis
June 4, 2024
In relating with a person or something, attention is focused with “you,” with something, or with the phenomenon, not that I’m relating with, not as relating with.

That I’m relating with you breaks the flow of withing, thus framing the moment
as relating with, which is representation of withing, to which I attend, relating to there being (or having been) withness of withing.

You know entrancement. But referring to that isn’t itself entrancing. You know reverie or free association, but likewise. There being immersion of oneself may emerge, being let by oneself releasing into released being aflow, where “I” am
the activity, without attention that I am.

Psychologists would say that automaticity takes over. Capability for playing tennis or an instrument prevails over the player, absorbs the player into the play.

Framing that: I was interplaying. Withing becomes as “with”: in relation to. So too, with any interness represented post facto as inter-ing: interaction, interface, which mostly is never realized as having been aflow—or never was aflow, just an assembled time: Oneself (to oneself) overtly relates to another, and may even have a sense of really “relating” as relating with, in an overt sense—“I’m with you on that”—but not having been immersed, not post facto representing a generative immersion. (I prefer ‘interality’ to ‘interness’ because ‘interal’ associates to immersive relating better than ‘intering’.)

In the beginning, cellular division evinces differentiation from itself (two cells).... An emergently sentient fetus just is experience without differentiation, which gains differentiation of modes of sensibility (hearing, movement, seeing through the thin wall of itself: the uterine wall which was once the “other” of blastular dif-
ferentiation). Beyond emergent prenatal differentiability, all natal phenomena are pre-representable modes of getting needs met (not yet as itself [distinctly] getting needs met, just being fascinations and needs), as baby gradually learns to disting-
uish its experience from an other who satisfies. (This is well-evidenced with infant research.)

Everything for baby is that which we later articulate as person-al presence. All phenomenality is personified as baby is learning to differentiate person from person.

Primal interality learns to better differentiate—and lives in a surround that eager-
ly draws one into differences which eagerly forget the primality of oneSelf which gives way to defining oneself relative to so many worldly differences.

Through developmental time (begenic individuation), primal Self gains capabil-
ities which become automatic implicities of habituation, largely controlled by one’s overt interests of action through preferred interaction, interfacing, and interplay.

Though capacity to let Selfality have its way aflow in play stays and grows as thrilling options for engagement (desired abandon), one’s life is largely about
overt purposes of oneself present.

Given ‘a’ relates to given ‘b’, rather than some new ‘c’ and ‘d’ emerging from
the same generative interality/being giving way to emergence: a surprising
realization, an inspiring phenomenon, a novel idea, the awesome horizon which mirrors one’s depths of appreciability, the enchanting appeal of another soul which seems to complete onself, the numinous advent which draws you into mystery.

I see a bookcase in front of me (back of my desk) and laugh to think “I am that” (merely), facing so many yet-to-be appreciated ventures of others to somewhat become. “I never know enough,” the old student can believe. “I’m to be more than this” keeps sensibility venturing.

“Who are you?” I am that. Really: I am that, I am: appellant cohering of ever-receding horizonal draw, like the seductive far edge of the sea drawing Odysseus into dangerous waters—though I’m not to become any great allegory.

Yet a narrativre emerges that we may aspire to embody, to enown, at best becom-
ing a story that is all which may remain after life.

Anyway, lots can be said about being with being, presence of presencing, of
a fluid interality,” a “reverie of heartfulness,” or making “a conceptual point.”

Soon, I want to focus on various modes of interality relative to:

  • a conception of enaction
• variable mental leaning of interality
• more on begenic relativity of interal presence
• lifepsychal interality
• conceptual interality
• interality of interpersonal life
• textual interality
Selfal mirroring in being with another person (typical to psychoanalysis)
• interality in creative engagement
• interality in teaching
• scaling appreciation of Our shared humanity.


  Be fair. © 2024, gary e. davis