One learns to make all kinds of distinctions, but all are hybrid derivatives of the modes of intelligence involved (upcoming), i.e., the modes of capacity that individ-uate many kinds of capability expressed as innumerable senses of self, others, and things composing lifeworldliness.

I would argue that the modularity of mind expresses general features of intelligence, individuated through each mode. This was proposed by Sternberg in 1990 (as I mentioned earlier), and time has born it out well (Gardner, Sternberg). Gardner proposed (and has since vastlyed corroborated) that “intelligence” is a composite of “multiple [separate] intelligences” (which echoes the literature on multi-modularity of mind in neuroscience), all of which have a temporal spatiality pertaining to general, “Sternbergian” features (discussion after next): kinesthetic, acoustic, visual, logical, linguistic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal (or selfal).

Oddness of calling interpersonal mentality or selfal mentality “intelligences” might be assuaged by appreciating that managing conceptions of self and other is a distinct kind of capability, rendered here earlier (and very furtherable) by portrayals of
S/s/p-differential phenomenality.

To indicate Sternbergian general capabilities is not to posit those capabilities as hard-wired capacities, only to claim that individuation of mental capacities across “Gardnerian” modes of intelligence has general features. Sternberg and his research teams have corroborated this over several decades, but have not bought into inflating their conception of intelligence to some general factor analysis (contrary to 19^th and most 20^th century notions of intelligence, which Sternberg long ago reviewed expertly).

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