3-fold recursivity — gary e. davis

	horizonal internality of 3-fold recursivity individuality of genesis, part 6 of 8 gary e. davis	May 9, 2017

	So, we have so far (previous section) a 3-fold differentiation of two global modes of Sternberg’s theory of intelligence (individuality and externality), which is highly corrorborated clinically (in terms of child development) and empirically in terms of the third global mode that I’ll sketch below. The third global mode (internality) looks much like an ordinary model of intelligence (especially inasmuch as one thinks of intelligence factorially, as “internal” to whatever is experienced). But the third global mode is an analysis of that which generates or individuates internal to the world the showing of the two global modes that I’ve so far mentioned. Sternberg doesn’t involve himself with a phenomenalogical approach (which I’ve outlined in above sections, but not distinguished clearly from a traditional phenomenological approach, commonly understood as a Husserlian tradition of construal). So, I have to say that I’m claiming about intelligence that it shows itself as if its consititutive basis emerges from phenomenality itself; or as if one’s lifeworldly horizon enacts phenomenality. The horizonal self-efficacious internality of the world (i.e., experience altogether) shows only as the “self-differentiating” of experience as “already” differentiated, increasingly including self-reflective individuality of being “in the world” as concealed (or self-disclosing) internality of the external world itself. In sum, the first two individuated global “expressions” (figuratively genetic) of intelligent enaction—the individualized externality of the world—are modeled as a 3-fold recursivity that phenomenally emerges from the “horizonal” internality of the third global mode (to be rendered below). Experientially, the internality of being in the world generates itself. That is, phenomenally, deep structure of individuation shows as the complex self-concealment of the world itself, as if externality of the world is due to self-differentiating in one’s horizons: individuation \| separation \| integration integrating \| individuating \| identifying shaping \| selecting \| adapting Such nebulosity of 3-fold troping surely doesn’t seem very insightful for an analytical interest. But phenomenally, the world’s self-differentiating can be analyzed as finely as one finds appropriate. Sternberg’s empirical theory of internality serves model-theoretic interests of developmental and educational psychology. I want to argue (in detail later) that model-theoretic thinking is congruent with the phenomenalogical modeling that I’ve begun to render. Both phenomenalogically and model-theoretically, analyzability always implies the capabilities that result in efficacious differentiation, preferring, and integrating which always implicate each other. Experience finds itself mirrored by the reflective window of reconstructive theory. Model-theoretic construal is the “other” of phenomenal construal. A model-theoretic dynamic of this is Sternberg’s third global mode of intelligence which through individual experience “creates” differential internality as of one’s world, as belonging to “the” world itself. Global/horizonal internality—recursive ”micro”-mentability or Sternberg’s “componential subtheory” of intelligence—consists of: “knowledge-acquisition components,” associated with the integrating activity of individuation. I’ll call this, for short: phenomenal mentation “performance components,” associated with the individuating activity of separation: enactive mentation “metacomponents,” associated with the identifying activity of integration: reflective mentation Each of those three micro-componential modes have 3 basic features (recursively considered: 3 x 3 = 9 features which are quantifiable by experimental assessments). These features are pertinent to empirical neuroscientific research: phenomenal correlates of the componential subtheory, associating to integrating activity of individuation (G of my F-G-E model introduced earlier) selected encoding selected combination selected comparison enactive components of the componential subtheory, associating to individuating activity of separation (E of my earlier model) active encoding (interested preferring) mapping and justification (coherence confidence building) inference and comparison (interfacial and extrapolative relating) reflective components of the componential subtheory, associating to identifying activity of integration (F of my earlier model) monitoring (feeling goodness of fit) planning (feeling efficacy of intentions) evaluation (feeling satisfaction of action) I expect that the above may seem to be a rather arbitrary categorization whose claim to recursive isomorphism is projected in terms that fit a desire to find 3-fold isomorphism, rather than resulting from empirical model building. Actually, the above categorization articulates empirically-derived modes of analysis which account for variability in “intelligent” action better than any other theory (as of this writing). Sternberg’s theory is widely regarded as the approach to theories of intelligence that is most corroborated by evidentiary research, and it has been very pertinent for educational psychology. Detailing that is beyond the scope of my narrating here; but the evidentiary data is compelling and (I can show) congruent with many humanistic models of mind. < previous -\|- Next: “language” of thinking -\|- topic: for love of conceptual inquiry

So, we have so far (previous section) a 3-fold differentiation of two global modes of Sternberg’s theory of intelligence (individuality and externality), which is highly corrorborated clinically (in terms of child development) and empirically in terms of the third global mode that I’ll sketch below.

The third global mode (internality) looks much like an ordinary model of intelligence (especially inasmuch as one thinks of intelligence factorially, as “internal” to whatever is experienced). But the third global mode is an analysis of that which generates or individuates internal to the world the showing of the two global modes that I’ve so far mentioned. Sternberg doesn’t involve himself with a phenomenalogical approach (which I’ve outlined in above sections, but not distinguished clearly from a traditional phenomenological approach, commonly understood as a Husserlian tradition of construal). So, I have to say that I’m claiming about intelligence that it shows itself as if its consititutive basis emerges from phenomenality itself; or as if one’s lifeworldly horizon enacts phenomenality.

The horizonal self-efficacious internality of the world (i.e., experience altogether) shows only as the “self-differentiating” of experience as “already” differentiated, increasingly including self-reflective individuality of being “in the world” as concealed (or self-disclosing) internality of the external world itself.

In sum, the first two individuated global “expressions” (figuratively genetic) of intelligent enaction—the individualized externality of the world—are modeled as
a 3-fold recursivity that phenomenally emerges from the “horizonal” internality of the third global mode (to be rendered below). Experientially, the internality of being in the world generates itself. That is, phenomenally, deep structure of individuation shows as the complex self-concealment of the world itself, as if externality of the world is due to self-differentiating in one’s horizons:

individuation | separation | integration
integrating | individuating | identifying
shaping | selecting | adapting

Such nebulosity of 3-fold troping surely doesn’t seem very insightful for an analytical interest. But phenomenally, the world’s self-differentiating can be analyzed as finely as one finds appropriate. Sternberg’s empirical theory of internality serves model-theoretic interests of developmental and educational psychology. I want to argue (in detail later) that model-theoretic thinking is congruent with the phenomenalogical modeling that I’ve begun to render. Both phenomenalogically and model-theoretically, analyzability always implies the capabilities that result in efficacious differentiation, preferring, and integrating which always implicate each other. Experience finds itself mirrored by the reflective window of reconstructive theory. Model-theoretic construal is the “other” of phenomenal construal.

A model-theoretic dynamic of this is Sternberg’s third global mode of intelligence which through individual experience “creates” differential internality as of one’s world, as belonging to “the” world itself.

Global/horizonal internality—recursive ”micro”-mentability or Sternberg’s “componential subtheory” of intelligence—consists of:

“knowledge-acquisition components,” associated with the integrating activity of individuation. I’ll call this, for short: phenomenal mentation
“performance components,” associated with the individuating activity of separation: enactive mentation
“metacomponents,” associated with the identifying activity of integration: reflective mentation

Each of those three micro-componential modes have 3 basic features (recursively considered: 3 x 3 = 9 features which are quantifiable by experimental assessments). These features are pertinent to empirical neuroscientific research:

phenomenal correlates of the componential subtheory, associating to integrating activity of individuation (G of my F-G-E model introduced earlier)

selected encoding
selected combination
selected comparison

enactive components of the componential subtheory, associating to individuating activity of separation (E of my earlier model)

active encoding (interested preferring)
mapping and justification (coherence confidence building)
inference and comparison (interfacial and extrapolative relating)

reflective components of the componential subtheory, associating to identifying activity of integration (F of my earlier model)

monitoring (feeling goodness of fit)
planning (feeling efficacy of intentions)
evaluation (feeling satisfaction of action)

I expect that the above may seem to be a rather arbitrary categorization whose claim to recursive isomorphism is projected in terms that fit a desire to find 3-fold isomorphism, rather than resulting from empirical model building. Actually, the above categorization articulates empirically-derived modes of analysis which account for variability in “intelligent” action better than any other theory (as of this writing). Sternberg’s theory is widely regarded as the approach to theories of intelligence that is most corroborated by evidentiary research, and it has been very pertinent for educational psychology. Detailing that is beyond the scope of my narrating here; but the evidentiary data is compelling and (I can show) congruent with many humanistic models of mind.

< previous -|- Next: “language” of thinking -|- topic: for love of conceptual inquiry