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  emergingness (c-conceptualty) in relation to
ordinary conceptuality
gary e. davis
May 12, 2017

Implicit efficacy of cohering conceptions (c-concepts) have individuated bases which elude conceptual enstancing or enframing (t-concepts or typal “representations”).
C-concepts are brought to linguistic rendering (I’m doing it). But emergent understanding or presence tokened by a c-concept is derived from inquirial, then discursive, excurses, whereas concepts presentable as explicit stances and frames name scalar interest susceptible to definite reference.

C-concepts trope capability efficacies as self-cohering of purposive enaction; or conceptions which implicate one’s Selfness (capability for comprehension), which I’ve called Selfality. Traditionally, that which I’m calling c-concepts have been pursued as “consitutive” notions of understanding, modernly deemed to be “transcendental a priori.” But that’s a metaphysicalist—or ontologistic—mistake born from Originist myths about the world having a primordially given structure or “fundamental ontology” awaiting disclosure.

Individuation of capabilities and Self conceptions have an “evo-devo” nature that is lived (exemplified by lifeworldliness of singular life), then retrojectively/ recon-structively rendered as—in my case—begenic emergence of capabilities and durably purposive Self-cohering of lifeworldliness.

Others theorize about “ontogeny” or work with observer-perspectival “develop-mental” theory. All of that is congruent with the conceptions of individuation that
I’m prospecting. But integrating other models of inquiry is beyond the scope of my present discussions.

It includes issues of how “phenomenological” and reconstructive (observer) inquiry might best be understood to belong together, “like” a mirror-windowing liminality of self with “other.”

Mental scientists resort to literary forms of discourse [citation]. Cognitive science seduces Literary minds [citation]). I look forward to dwelling with this in upcoming work with others’ new models of recent years (e.g., models of adult development).

Reconstructive conceptual inquiry into c-conceptuality (from Kant through Husserlian “phenomenological reduction” to contemporary philosophy of mental science) serves futural interests (project-ive conceptual interests) of temporal coherence (e.g., Creating Consilience), but such work is not excavating a priori conditions for any given structural possibility of understanding. Such work is prospecting an evolving organon of conceivability.

What we so far comprehend about the individuation of mentability and lifeworld understanding is always individuating for-and-by the inquirer; and is participating in Our evolving capabilities for comprehension, paradigmatically in terms of leading evidence-based modeling. The “ultimate” cohering that is classically desired is really an evolutionarity whose conception by Us is evolving.

One way to usefully distinguish c-conceptual and t-conceptuality (tropal or typal conceptuality), relative to t-conceptuality, is to call c-conceptuality pre-enstantial and t-conceptuality enstantial and pre-enframal. In other words, we perspectivize (enframe) relative to derived stances of interpretation (hermeneutics, in a model-specific sense), but the capability for derivation and individuating (begenic) capability for telically cohering such activity is “captured” only discursively (retrojectively / reconstructively) with derived concepts troping highly-derivative conceptions (e.g., “telic cohering” or “begeny”).

Being made enstantiable, thus possibly pragmatic (tropal/typal concepualizing through situationally-evinced enstancing) allows for apt concepting (or conceptions in definitely referential senses) or enframing. But the “being made” names a discursive emergence of understanding “something” (a self-efficacy of capability as overt enstancing) that is only retrojectively prospectible (or characterizable: “...a self-efficacy of capability...”). In other words, a c-concept names emergent understanding of its discursive formation about “something” (begenic emergingness) thereby named, but not definitely describable, except retrospectively relative to modeling within controlled conditions or artificial constraints.

T-conceptuality is readily tropal or typal, concerned with discrete kinds, and is the normal way that we group, region, modalize, and domain things. A trope can be readily regarded as prototypical of a modality of sensibility (mode of intelligence).
It’s pro-visional of a specifiable, more-complex conception which is susceptible to definite description.

But even there, scaling “up” to encompass more comprehension about compre-hending expresses a continuum of prospecting which becomes nebulous because
the capability for comprehension (the comprehending) that is employed to understand is eventually implicating itself as a conception of self-articulability, in principle always still individuating or advancing intelligibility. Living intelligibility is always still-advancing its potential in discursive conceptions of its conceivability. Theorizing that—the individuational relativity of self-generative and self-enhancive comprehensibility—reaches issues of evolutionary intelligibility that belong to the relevant community of inquiry (available modalities of inter-domainal inquiry), such that “ultimately” no one yet seems to understand intelligibility better than the apparently leading way of comprehending—or so a given inquirer feels as if that’s the case altogether, implying an audacious claim to have found, dwelled with, and embodied the leading “estate” or manifold flowering of intelligibility.


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