I make a distinction between a good life and the good of community, glyphically by using ‘goodG’ for community, ‘good_’ for a life (which is text-searchably useful in my notes). Good (“good”) irt nebulous, ordinary usage stays ‘good’. (A more-introductory version is here; and links back to this page.)

A notion of the Good is best understood as a continuum of pertinence (‘good*’). We might have a notion of the Good of humanity. Is “the” goodG best understood relative to some goodH? Or is the notion of goodH best understood as an emergent “character” of Our array of potentially goodG communities? The latter, of course.

I think that a good* consequentialism can be more than viable (e.g., re: thinking about assessible public policy). A “new consequentialism” can be derived from a good* conception of virtue based in a non-naturalistic conception of “natural goodness” (re-conceived in terms of research-based “positive psychology”). I’m confident that a virtue consequentialism works better for good* than other views of value theory (of which “ethical” theory is best understood to be derivative, while derivative “moral” difference is best understood as a deontological ethics, pragmatically interested in enforceable “law”).

Relative to a discursive continuum from (in short) protean aspiration to a sense of Anthropocenic virtue, I’m prospecting a conception of so-called “greater good” (a notion I love from educational thinking), i.e., good*, relative to senses of aggregated emergent (regional) “good” orders that are qualitatively evaluable. (That’s [to be] discussed via the “progressive practice” Area of The Project.)

Value theory (theory of good*) is part of a higher interest in cultivating humanity and understanding Our evolving in primarily cultural terms (not sociocentrically, let alone naturalistically). Value, as such, implies Our fundamental interest in good* lives (or being as well as possible, ideally advancing good*).