lifeworldliness • gary e. davis • berkeley


	Area	Spring Points

	“lifeworld”: lifeworldliness gary e. davis	June 2020

Attention to the lifeworld notion in “Spring Points” so far has briefly postured innerworldliness (introversional-leaning life) of one Self irt outerworldliness (extraversional-leaning) of interpersonal relations. That can be usefully parsed as resonance of S/s-differential flow (for creative interest: an authoriality) irt s/p-differential engagements with others (an authorship).

Altogether, dyadic mutuality lives richly (at best) in terms of project-ive interests, manifold understanding, relational involvements, sensing, feeling, perceiving, intuiting, thinking, and valuing of others, experiences, and things.

Creativity of oneSelf lives beyond/behind occasioned stances, frames, and pre-sentations: “Creative life itself is like an authoriality beyond its various theaters,”
I noted earlier here (“validity of appropriative engaging”), “embodying individu-ated time ‘behind’ its various theaters.”

That could be historized bibliophilicly (i.e., relative to readings of others) for re-thinking Heidegger’s differentiation of historicity (of oneSelf) and historicality
(of one’s inworldness) in Being and Time, isomorphic with his abandoned differ-entiation of “existentiell” and “existential” elements of being.

But I’d prefer to focus on later works (“ways”) by him.

Many years ago, I anticipated explicating the notion of lifeworldliness relative to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, which I didn’t give time to detailing. Since then, the notion has become more individuated, 2017 and 2019.

And Habermas has extended his own conception, first in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and recently in Postmetaphysical Thinking II, which I’ll discuss eventually.

Prior to that, I want to explicate lifeworldliness relative to general individuation of good lives, particularly relative to empirically well-defined “Values in Action” research. But that would be derivative of a conception of conceptuality as such, with practical interest (for my part) in supporting interdomainal studies, i.e., humanistically astute sciences betrothed with scientifically astute humanities.

I find virtue in that, for the sake of Our general interest in advancing the quality
of lives.

Evolution as a progressive notion only makes sense relative to intelligent life interested in progressivity (e.g., greater flexibility irt more complex oppor-tunities). Conceptions of evolution are products of scientific artistry.

Formal conceptuality aspiring to conceptual converging faces the human condi-tion of primordial openness: Our evolving potential for conceivability.

Ultimately, We face the night whose beginning will forever remain uncaptured
by originative conceptions for which the Universe unwittingly gives way.

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