Spring Points
| Area |
Spring Points |
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| formal tropology: conceptual philology gary e. davis |
June 2020 |
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The agenda of the previous section could be pursued with interest in tight well-formedness, yet the centripetal appeal of doing that would finally open into a sense of ultimacy that is, so to speak, Openness in Itself, while constructive depths of transitioning from tropical conceptualization to mathematical fundamentals of manifold dynamics (not mere structural manifold)—bridging quantum gravita-tional mysteries with genomic regulatory mysteries? (which seems altogether absurd)—could only be discourse whose conceptuality implicates its own evolu-tionarity. So, more overt focus on conceptuality as such—detached from any interest that evinces its common relevance—has no valid implicature of primordial engage-ment beyond the discernible primordiality of one’s interest. “By default: concepts are accessed in a context-independent manner” (Conceptual Mind, ch. 20) while “access” is by and from lifeworldly engagements. An abstracted consideration of concepts is easily self-undermining (self-concealing). Topology of conceptuality is individuationally lifeworldly—which also pertains to large-scale literatures con-vened into telic cohering, such as pursuing the “nature” of gardening scientificity. Bring on the “Wild systems theory as a 21st century coherence approach for cognitive science” (Open MIND: philosophy and the mind sciences in the 21st century, 2016, v.1, p 807ff). Does “Conceptual innovation on the frontiers of science” (Conceptual Mind, ch. 16) conceal the reality of paradigmicity’s incapability to account for one’s potent-ial to frame that paradigmicity (i.e., to work trans-paradigmatically)? Conceptual-izing the dynamic potential for that can be as elusive as the constitutivity of Gödel’s Theorem by individuated capability for formal-logical invention. (I could say “axiological” invention, if that wasn’t already an awful name for theory of value.) There’s no real “ont-“ to ontology, just scalable continua of interests that can be comprehended and drawn into pretenses of comprehensive comprehension. Merriam-Webster’s definition of the “combining form” ‘ont-‘ puts its ordinary, lexically-ambivalent colon at “1 being : existence,” which misleads by its classi-cally definite simplicity, a reciprocal “as”: being of existence as existence of being. And how about “2 individual living thing : living organism”? Is the “thing” that’s alive the same as an organism? Either way (objectified or not), the ont- is not just living; it’s individual. The fun superficiality there mirrors ordinary conceptual ambivalence, which is as lifeworldly (in its un-individuated proximality) as is my highly individuated con-tinuum of prospective narrating, from lifeworldliness as such through intimations of scientific artistry brought into a centripetal appeal of ultimate cohering (which, again, could be pursued for the sake of rigorous well-formedness). The classical “onticness” of ontology is a precious, enablative conceptual ideology of evolving mentability that became concealed mythology to philosophical history longing to stay queen of sciences. Yet, studying concepts as such can be immensely useful, but implies the continu-ing question: for what use? What’s wanted with rigorous formality’s clarity? I would enjoy dwelling with “What is conceptual understanding” (Articulating the World: conceptual understanding and the scientific image, 2015, ch. 2). There can be good pragmatic reason to inquire into “Principles of categorization” (Concepts: core readings, 1999 ch. 8) or Peacocke’s “Précis of A Study of Concepts” (ibid., ch. 14) or “possession conditions [of] concepts?” (ch. 16). Precisely: What do we want to do? (Here’s a fun thing that turned up this week: Singular Thought and Mental Files.) Hilary Putnam began his career as a philosopher of mathematics, transitioned to Reality with a Human Face, and ended still rightly questioning realist pretenses of naturalism because, a least, the reality of concepts just is one’s conceptions of reality. There are many resources I could annotate now about conceptuality as capability, as prototypical (tropical? algorithmic?), and as linguistic (which is essentially tropical, not begenically constitutive). As, as, as…”Is” conceals the phenomenality of there being X as always “X” (framed, stanced, enacted).
Millikan’s distinction between “informational” and “intentional” signs (p. 4 top) seems to be isomorphic with the difference between receptive phenomenality (granting) and responsive phenomenality (bearing), which has its correlate of other-granting (mirroring) and other-bearing (windowing).
next—> epilogue |
| Be fair. © 2020, gary e. davis |