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  mirroring involvement with window
divining differences, part 3 of 5
gary e. davis
April 22, 2017

Phenomenality is a window of (for) receptiveness and responsiveness; and also, at the same time, a mirror of interest/preference, capability, and engagement. There being a phenomenon is like a windowing mirror of receptiveness (outerworldly domain, innerworldly range) and responsiveness (innerworldly domain, outerworldly range), primally experienced (in effect) as indifference (pre-differentiability) of inner-/outer-, domain and range—primordially experienced (in highly creative divining) as synergy (or generative nebulousness) of one as the other—in, for, with, to, of each other.

Discerned topography is literal, and we discover things reliably. Yet, the boundary between the frames of meaning we confidently apply (evidentiary workability) and discern (certifiable evidence) is—“is”—ambiguous. We grant that... It gives one confidence to grant of it. It bears up that... We give it validity borne of it.

Suddenly standing in dense words looking back: A profusion of implicatures require a few seconds to discern which belong to the same contexts, contexts to the same interests—if that matters to, say, an audacious violet.

What’s the best way to understand the tropography of a text, a conversation, a private reverie?

What’s the difference between a tropology and a conceptuality?

Are biogenic autogeny and mindal individuation two kinds of ontogeny? Is “ontogeny” really (“really”?) tropogeny? Who says there’s an “onto-” apart from a conceptual tropogeny of individuation (which we model with developmental scaffolds applied curricularly, pedagogically, and clinically)?

Is the receptiveness/responsiveness—the autogeny—of a stemming brain unrelated to the receptiveness/responsiveness of mental presence? That is: Is a mind a kind of organism that is increasingly autonomous of its employed brain? Does selectivity of influences individuate “mind” so singularly that mind can only be ultimately explained in its own terms?

Yet, there is biophenomenality: impulse, feeling, aura, intrusion. Biophenomenality shows through tropiphenomenal appeal: what’s “attractive,” appealing—and as apparently “raw” emotion (which is a fiction of disowning value, I would argue), as if earlier stages of one’s maturation echo as the auratic horizon of discrete appeal (or aversion).

Phenomenality can be detailed: phenomenography, so to speak, of granted value and borne emotion in letting be, in letting be feeling.

“Clematis and Verbena laughed as they looked at the other ‘girl’.” But were they really dismissive? Or is it that I was dismissive of them? Did they feel uncomfortable with their own dismissiveness, such that they “suffered” exclusion of their cluelessness? Or am I exploiting their presence (mirroring my own) for my interest in narrative play (self-differential musing)?

A psychography is somewhere discernible everywhere, where liminality of other and self is nebulous. Various psychological models can be brought to bear. Constructible genealogies of lives are “there.” A genealogy of psychological models is constructible. Kinds of genealogies may merge into kinds of individuations to which genealogies appeal.

Phenomenography bears (letting be) what one can grant (letting be). And derived phenomenology is constructed post facto, which can validate a genealogy (“history”) of given phenomenography (e.g., what investigative journalism does), thereby enstancing a phenomenogeny. Is that a temporal tropography (a conceptual rhetoric of development) of its subject phenomenography?

Immanently, a phenomenon has a generative background, apart from a phenomenological claim about its genealogy (which is reconstructive, re-presentative). By examining the individuation of one’s interest/preference, capability, and engagement (a very difficult clinical venture), a genealogy of an understanding, in terms of specific phenomena, can be derived in terms of the life, with all kinds of phenomenological frames applicable.

The singularity of the life requires a hybridity of interpretive frames brought to bear. An altogether cohering phenomenology of that would be derived from phenomenally-based interest in the genealogy of understanding, such that phenomenology is really a constellational hybrid of extrapolations (kinds of interpretive enstancing and enframing) from manifold phenomenographies emergent relative to proximally (after primally) undifferentiated phenomena, not relative to a genetic origin, but from others themselves.

Phenomenology is authentically a discourse of emergence, not a discourse of genesis. Notions of genealogy are always post facto relative to what calls for explanation—explanation which serves generative interest in moving on, flourishing, developing, and even divining telos like callings from the mysteries.

A simpler venue is enaction: To understand enacting of something, one looks back from what’s enacted: an act-based reconstruction of enacting. From that, a model of enacting may be evinced or a given model corroborated. That is: -ography calls for “genetic” accounting in terms of -ologies that find cohering of the two. But to what end? Things are always done with purpose. The resultant logic (constellating of -ological stories) implies that too, as a telic cohering is always what is explained. Actions don’t just happen (like behavioral patterns). Things are done “for a reason.”

But whether or not a given model explains an act is relative to comprehending intimacy of generative relationship between enacting and the act, not a constitutive relationship between enacting and later-separated act that precedes enacting (except relative to post facto models that have gained explanatory durability). Purposive enacting itself is the “origin” of enacting. We are primordially prospective, by designs we imagine and fabricate. As developing intelligences, we have no origin other than being.

Models (logics) of action are emergent from arrays of “graphed,” then genealogized enactivites (“genetics,” in a tropical sense of -ogeny or -genics). Distinctions between act and retroactively discerned enacting are made, in light of which differentated modeling may confidently (evidentially) emerge. -Ologies derive from -ogenies serving their telic phenomenographies—geneses of tropographies calling for explanation. Reconstructions serve already-emergent purposes, and how that is best modeled to be is a phenomenalogy, so to speak distinctively (distinct from ordinary reference to “phenomenology” that pretends to disclose perdurant constitutivities).

For experience—enacting itself—the en-activeness of enacting shows in the appeal of the phenomenality: the (re-presented) act, as simple phenomenality that is the act. This can then be retrospectively (and re-presentably) differentiated from the nebulous preferring (or desiring) of capable enagement that simply shows as-and-in doing “something.”

All talk, you see, of “pure” phenomenality is by way of already-highly differentiated interests of individuation (then, inquirial interest) that must “annul” itself not as dis-involved epoché, but as wholly engaged release, letting be “other” being as if being oneself wholly enthralled. Discovery does not happen by back-standing enframing (which is where Husserlian and crypto-Cartesian cognitive science begin).

One’s receptiveness as enacting desire shows as the “responsiveness” of there being what’s to do. One’s responsiveness as enacting desire shows as the “receptiveness” of there being what’s done. Receptiveness (granting, letting) shows in the phenomenality of responsiveness (bearing, being: there)—implied responsiveness through receptiveness, impled inner- through -outer, implied domain through range.

Or at least, that’s an interesting way to dramatize the appealing difference between receptiveness and responsiveness (rc/rs difference—which I bold for the sake of easy reference later from other pages) which is immanent in all interesting phenomenality (and is biogenically primordial, on the way to intelligent presence). Whether or not the above improvisation gels with any particular case, it’s indisputable that there is difference between enacting and resultant act; emergence (phenomenography) and stance (phenomenogeny); self-generativity (enacting) and telic cohering derived about it (phenomenalogy).

I would argue that the receptive/responsive difference is “perpendicular” to graphical, “genetic,” and logical difference; i.e., each of the three can be usefully regarded as involving rc/rs presencing. One’s receptiveness in phenomenality (engagement) evinces responsiveness (pheomenographical framing), the background of which one may find appealing and fruitful (calling for worthwhile genealogical work). Or the telic “ecology” of enactional phenomenography may be the prevailing interest for conceptual analysis (phenomenology in the traditional sense).

Yet the further (deeper, higher) one delves into either tropogeny (and genesis) or tropology (and conceptual archaeology), the more that one becomes a self-formative ecogeny of conceptual phenomenality, mirroring one’s capability through the window of discovery and disclosure—which may become mysteries of how there is anything at all: phenomenality, differentiation; outer, inner; other, self; bearing, granting; being, letting; and so on.


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  Be fair. © 2017, gary e. davis