August 25

You know about the cultural norm of how far one stands from another in polite conversation, such that standing too close can cause some persons to back away. It might work reciprocally: Back away, and the other person will move toward you—if it’s all friendly. On an inner city street, though, moving toward the other person might be considered an offense, causing the other person to come back “in yo’ face.”

So, too, for nations, sometimes (politics is psychology writ large?). Russia is in NATO’s face. Russian political identity sees geography like the tough street, rather than as, say, an appealing mall (or fair market). During the Cold War, the market of Western Europe became so appealing to Soviet Eastern Europe (and to Russian citizens) that Soviet force collapsed the Soviet Union, by so undermining economic productivity that tit-for-tat military competition bankrupted the USSR. And the appeal continues between NATO and governments of “new” Europe.

Appeal trumps force, in the long run. In potentially self-determinative events (e.g., emergent decisions in elections), an enabling appeal of an argument or position is superior to a causal force. Force can’t make a position better. The genuine compellingness of a position for freedom of choice results from genuineness of its appeal.

So, whose influence belongs to a given place? Whose sphere belongs “here”? The residents deserve to decide whose appeal deserves to prevail (obviously!). A tough guy can’t win loyalty, in the long term, by dictating the boundaries of his sphere. But an appeal wins loyalty by extending itself, as appeal (which anyone in the marketing business knows). Real value or worth is inherently generative; force is not.

This is why Russian force will ultimately lose the game of spheres to the European market.

Ronald Steel (a professor of international relations at USC) today calls “Russia’s concerns over American meddling in its traditional sphere of influence...rational” (NY Times, 8/24), i.e., American engagement with Georgia is meddling, because (evidently) Russia is a “great power,” deserving more respect.

No doubt, Russia views Eastern Europe “as a necessary zone of protection,” but that can’t be presumed rational (thus worthy of great respect), if there’s no good reason to need protection from NATO. NATO is not a real threat to Russia. (According to a Clinton-era specialist on NATO and Russia, whom I quoted earlier, NATO didn’t make plans toward Russia after the end of the Cold War because NATO didn’t consider Russia an enemy.) NATO has been highly vocal about redefining itself relative to needs for intraregional protection, not interregional protection. It is not the case that “NATO is essentially still a cold-war military pact seeking a new identity that it has not yet found.” There is no plausibility to Russia’s fear of NATO. The Dialectical Federation’s self-alienation from NATO is a self-serving fiction for political bullying.

Steel just presumes that whatever Russia perceives is rational (“Today’s leaders in Moscow are determined to protect what they perceive as their vital interests”) because, evidently, the Big Guy must have Big Views (might makes right; or, as Steel says, “great powers live by different rules than do minor ones”). “[D]eployment of American missiles into Eastern Europe and Washington’s effort to extend NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia” is, to Steel, comparable to “Moscow...sign[ing] up Cuba and Venezuela in a military pact and then tr[ying] to plant missiles there pointing north.”

But that’s absurd. Firstly, Steel presumes a Cold War sense of Europe (as if “Eastern Europe” is still distinct from the rest of Europe), which, surely, Russia wants to presume, but that’s invalid. Secondly, Ukraine and Georgia want NATO membership; the appeal of NATO is not analogous to a use of force. Thirdly, Ukraine and Georgia are geographical neighbors of NATO; NATO is not a U.S. instrument of overseas militarism. And last but not least, the U.S. missles aren’t pointed at Russia, and Russia knows that it has complete access to the sites, for monitoring everything that the missle shield is up to.

“It was inevitable that the Russians, now restored to prosperity by their oil and gas resources, would push back somewhere.” Yeah, because Russian power is still Czarist—not that Russia has some right to control eastern Europe regardless of local preferences. Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili is “hot-headed” (Steel) because Russia has for years aggressively backed Ossetian thuggery against resident Georgians.

Steel is just misinformed in saying: “What has followed [Russia’s invasion] in Washington is a field day of self-righteous indignation.” The indignation has been about disproportionate violence across internationally-recognized borders in support for a region pervaded with organized crime (protected by Russian “peacekeepers”) that was shelling undisputed Georgian territory before Georgia attacked Tskhinvali.

What Steel is defending is a realpolitik toward Russia, as if Washington just isn’t Kissingerian enough. “[G]reat powers....demand respect — and obedience — from their weak neighbors.” It’s the way of the jungle, er, world (state of nature). “This may be a shame, but it is the way the world works, and always has,” says Steel. Steel’s confidence in this steely point is expressed by the U.S. Monroe Doctrine of 1895, as if: Once An Imperialist, Always Respect Future Imperialism. That principle of realpolitik led to The Great War of 1914-1945. A UN-NATO-OSCE sphere of influence developed afterward in order to overtly counter such thinking.

Steel goes on to elaborate his realpolitk of appeasement, but imprudently. Steel advises that “Condoleezza Rice should have jetted off to Moscow, not Tbilisi.” But, in fact, the U.S. was already in close contact with Moscow, and a demonstrative act of jetting to the Czar rather than to the democracy that was invaded would have been disastrous for American credibility in world affairs.

Washington’s suggestion that Russia could be excluded from the G8 was not “careless talk about throwing Russia out.” But carelessness is shown by Steel.

Yet, Steel is right to advise that “we should meet with our NATO partners to work out a common approach to the problem of ethnic separatism.” But he’s late: That was partly what the NATO-Russia Council was for—and what was the process of the early ‘90s that stopped the Russia-Georgia war and put Russian peacekeepers in Ossetia? Wake up, Ronald.

Steel is further misinformed when he claims that “We handled this badly in the Balkans by facilitating the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines, and then, over vociferous Russian objections, recognizing the rebellious Serbian province of Kosovo as a separate state.” Actually, the violent dismemberment was going on before NATO intervention, which greatly facilitated a peaceful dissolution of Serbian thuggery against an Albanian population that had sought peacefully for years to be Albanian.

Russia intimidates Ronald Steel. “[I]t would not seem prudent to pick a fight with Russia over a rebellious, territorially ambitious former province.” But that province has become a lackey of Russian thuggery. The Great War of the 20th century was about the need for appeal of principle to draw a line in the sand against irrational force.

How the world is (realpolitik) is no basis for how the world should be. Good reason and the essentially human interest in choosing one’s government and making one’s future deserves to prevail. John Q. Adams’ isolationism of 1821 (cited by Steel in closing) is no longer an option, and the alternative is no “search [for] monsters to destroy” (Steel’s connotation?). If anything, we need the monsters to become genuine partners. I presume he agrees, but he doesn’t provide good sense for such an appeal.

Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located (NY Times, 9/1.a).

In other words, Russia’s friends will stay Russia’s friends, or else. And Georgia is next:

David Bakradze, the chairman of the Georgian Parliament, told [Roger Cohen, at the Democratic National Convention last week]: “Russia’s aim is to weaken Georgia to the point that NATO allies are scared, instability brings regime change, and the map of Europe is changed by military force” (NY Times, 9/1.b).