home page poesis, so called autotelic self  
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indwelling
april 29, 2011

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1 | A day in mind is part of there being oneself in dailiness. Being in mind is part of a mind in being (container contained). “The” day manifoldly mirrors oneself: attentions, appreciations, priorities, altogether making a day mine: “So, how was your day?” “Mine, thank you.”

2 | The worldliness of inworldness (dailiness) includes the “in” of there being a scene one’s in, a tangible environment one’s in, or feeling contained by feeling (in a flow of feeling) warmly inhabited by imagining, memories, appreciations of a surround, or reverie of thought. The sense of things and others belonging with me is part of my belonging in the day, the world (more than belonging to anything—a scene, an environment—of the day). The resonance of things, others, experiences, as if conveying themselves to me (including literally—persons, dogs, magpies, pet monkeys—yet here only inasmuch as that) expresses my giving in to the day as [if] worldliness gives way to me. (I have no dog, etc.) Life can [seem to] be a lovely mirrorplay (funny days, strange life).

3 | “The” mind—as such always proximally relative to one’s own—“belongs to” oneself, we might say, as if it’s in one’s world like other intangible meaning: the sense of oneself as mentality (“myself” as mind). Yet, a conception of myself as mentality is part of the worldliness (mine: mentality of there being mind, my being of a mind—mindality’s worldliness) that has conceptions (including a sense of one’s mind): one’s sense of lifetime, having been 11 years old, “having” an identity, Belonging altogether to my Life.

4 | The entire phenomenality of the world is also a weave of conceptions, giving way as well as defining other “things” (phenomena), playing into flows of experience (as well as being an “object”/subject in mind), discerning possibility as well as finding a landscape already horizoned, finding a moment memorable as well as being overwhelmed by another’s presence. Generally, being in mind plays into being “in” the world, as in-being belongs to embodied mindality—”the” mind of intrinsically-embodied living—as inworldness itself (a possible indwelling, as if of all presence, all capability for presencing).

5 | All the phenomena of there being a day may weave into all the differences time has instilled (through individuation), including differing senses of oneself, possibly as distinct as oneself can be distinct in the day? Through self-differentiation, psychality (psychicness, mindedness) might contain a sense of itself as omnitemporal being-contained by phenomenal time (which existential phenomenology prospects, in a sense)—being inhabited by (indwelling) all worldliness all-ing, as if worlding of the world could be a psyche’s mentability—psychality, mindality—as such, thus all presencing, thus all inworldness, including “mind” (as living concept of psyche).



6 | I’m easily distinct in the day—though I never think that, except in analytical writing or self-reflective creativity. One doesn’t ordinarily have occasion (desire or need) to say “I’m distinct.” But tangibly, it’s quite obvious. Intangibly may be obvious, too—is obvious to me and may be to others: “I” is (I’m) beyond what’s apparent in a scene or an interpersonal history. I’m beyond this era of my life, not only as futural engagement, as if in a singular Project of living, but obviously expressing a past, an individuation, which can be characterized—beyond a present in a presence of time (of the day) and a Presence of time: of a life, of intimacies (of a history of intimacies), of kindreds, of engagements (family, career, creative projects), and of places. “I” tropes a manifold. I’m a manifold of identifications and differences. A flourishing of identifications can group themselves into kinds, as if the flow of life can be so many identities selfidentifying themselves: regions of a life forming themselves, regioning identifications into selforming identities—manifoldly phenomenal, manifoldly psychal (selfidentical), manifoldly interpersonal, richly interpsychal (e.g., intimate love, textual intimacy), or highly conceptual (beyond technically complex).

 

 

 

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