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inhabiting my café
october 9, 2011

1 | Asking “What is there?” is vastly different from the specific “What is there?”


Here—there, to you.

What’s t/here is a phenomenal resonance, like perceiving/perceived.

Speaking largely, what there is may be defined in some useful way relative to what’s present for a given moment or scene. Relative to what’s t/here, what t/here is is largely hidden (or implied in relative absence that’s inferred).

2 | The notion of absence in the present arises developmentally (it seems to me) by way of two kinds of experience: experience of otherness and experience of objectness. Firstly, not being understood (e.g., being hungry but the feeder doesn’t yet get it) is the basis of realizing that there is otherness: “I” is not everything (but I am—and that I am is most important). I cry, therefore primal difference is “asserted” as amply appreciated. Secondly, things confound one, thereby “asserting” themselves as more otherly than persons: an object apparently having its own way altogether. There’s a hiddenness about how things go. Others may respond; objects “won’t” (though we happily personify objects as surrogate others, when we can control them—or, later, objectify others when we need to control them regardless of their preferences, commonly after having felt controlled too often, but having learned how to “reciprocate”—displace the issue—with controllable others).

3 | The first kind of experience (with others) seems to be the basis for a notion of inner/outer. There’s there, outside my control. The second kind of experience (with things) seems to be the basis for a notion of given/hidden. There it is, yet it may be gone (I discover). Or: It is that merely, but suddenly, mysteriously changes (e.g., it moves itself—or seems to), as if hiddenness has revealed itself. The wind is filled with invisible intentions, as if someone is handling nature.

4 | I am, therefore I play. It moves, therefore it’s like me. Things move as I play; things play into my game. What’s there has a hidden innerness I evince, and I have a given outerness I may control to my advantage.

5 | Differences can hybridize in basic conceptual development. There are countless differences disclosed in growing up—differences discovered, differences constructed, including imaginative (constructive) discoveries and insightful (informed) constructions.

6 | Consider an odd dyad: feeling “vs.” object. I “have” a feeling. I “have” an object. I can give up an object. Can I give up a feeling? Or: I can’t give up an object. “I want the object” becomes, in some partial sense, “I am the object.” Attachment unfulfilled becomes attachments replaced (or unfulfilled attachment displaced in fulfilling attachments). Attachments fulfilled become releases, licenses to run away and explore! One imprints, secures that, then moves on. Otherwise, bonding becomes fetishism (if not addiction to love of an “object”), if not chronic unhappiness. “I can surrender to feeling”(once upon a time, being wholly myself) can become “I feel myself in the object.” “I am the object of feeling.” “Feeling there for the other, I am here.”

7 | Very differently (given a free efficacy of feeling): Communing in “nature,” I may feel a wholeness of self. Awesome nature becomes a mirror of appealing self reflection. The aura of there being great Presence calls one into a oneness, as if figuring one’s ownmost potential in one’s conception of Presence.

8 | All kinds of things can happen to differences—not-yet-differentiating and differentiating—depending on how you play it (or how some mirrorplay goes its way).

Your friendly psychalanalyst at your service. Where shall we go?

Here, wherever I please.

9 | Tangible/Intangible difference (liminality, threshold) may be usefully considered symbolic (or, more exactly, metonymic) of a general, trans-categorial difference (or type): discernible/indiscernible—which includes (is tokened by) modes of sensible/nonsensible difference or liminality, including visible/invisible which is often metaphoric for the general discernible/indiscernible difference, which may be conceptualized (abstracted) in differences like comprehensible/incomprehensible.

“Reality” is just another degree of appearance, which as such is a kind of reality (an insight that led me to phenomenology as an undergraduate).

10 | What a bouquet of differences there is—no: a carnival. Bricolage flowers into garden, landscape—yet what is there to all discernibility and comprehensibility? Is it best understood as some sense of mindal worldliness or worlded scale of mind? The philosophical choices reduce to singular discernings (i.e., the great philosopher or literary mind becomes a type of comprehensibility—”Shakespearean”), even in a lineage comprehended as altogether cohering: “The” history of philosophy becomes philosophy of historizability, nowadays (and for evermore) to be known as some sense of our evolving (in our evolving).

11 | How might The Library be integrated? (What’s the ontic implicature of a comprehensive taxonomy?)

No wonder I haunt cafés alone—or dread the common result of someone else sitting nearby. “May I?” Of course. “How are you today?,” says the stranger. However I please, thank you—which, in so many polite variations, is easily a conversation stopper, once confessed in some improvisation.

The novel that is his life finishes a polite conversation and leaves.

I love my solitude amid the arrays of the day. I apparently look lonely to the lonely. But no; it’s a complement to having fun in other ways: affairs of conversation, time, and embodied mind through my eros of emergent seasoning.

Next: section 4 of “a sense of inworldness”


  Be fair. © 2017, gary e. davis