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appealing emergences
october 15, 2011

1 | I haven’t gone back to look carefully at my earlier uses of ‘inner-directedness’ and the like, until today. What I’ve sketched earlier now feels like a preface to undefined use of ‘inner-directed,’ etc., in “human flourishing implies a ‘Self’ interested ethic” (11/09), §§ 2.6, 3.1, and 3.6. I’m not thinking anything today that I hadn’t been living with two years ago—which is no surprise, since (as I mentioned) the interest goes back decades. But I use terms confidently without first dwelling with them (a meaning-in-use sense of conveying meaning, implicitly expressing “What I mean by X is how it is used in the context of this discussion.” Further explication would be relative to the given discussion). This is probably unfortunate, but it’s interesting that I don’t wish to revise the discussion. Rather, you see what I would employ, in that case, as part of a slice-and-dice rethinking of the entire Website (which will happen up the road). I’m sharing raw footage which I don’t feel need to re-make (thankfully).

Six months later, in “Individuation” (April, 2010), he stridently wrote:

So be it that my inner-directedness, my recursivity of self-understanding reflectivity, the generativity of selformativity, results in semantic compression (begging questions of terminology), poiesis without mystification (I would argue), conceptual prospecting in its own element, welcoming another’s questioning of my self understanding (without hyphen) as a chance to realize newly and learn—but gladly otherwise going my own way, playing into the Appeal.

Lovely boy.

2 | A year later (April of this year), in the wake of “phenomenality,” I first showed salient engagement online with an inner-/outer- difference at numbered ¶s 1-3 of “among evolving characters,” mention of which isn’t vanity because I intimate there a sense of the phenomenal origin of “spiritual” life which (I first saw last week) Terrence Deacon corroborates (to my mind; we’ve never met) in his expert analysis of the symbolic origin of religion (which Robert Bellah apparently adopts, in terms of originary religion’s hoped-for Arrival of the hidden world which is to be another, better world—expressing the human facility for imaginative progress).

For me, Deacon is quite encouraging! Again, I so look forward to his book (late November, to be a Thanksgiving gift to myself.) An upshot would be that the primordial emergentness of reality (in terms of contemporary science) was phenomenally “read,” in paleohistorical life, as revelation of hidden intentionality (inner forces “behind” or within discernibility) due to the intrinsically differentiating character of symbolization originating from developmental self/world differencing projected into the objectivity of nature.

This is actually not news: Simply put, we personify nature. But Deacon is proffering a cognitive-evolutionary basis for phenomenal perception that’s allegedly the nature of such personification—or so I surmise.

Anyway, it’s not news that anthropology is awash in ethnologies of The Hidden and projective innerworldliness.

3 | Formal phenomenology has done great things with issues of disclosure and projection. So, too, psychoanalysis (in the generic sense, which includes whatever school of psychoanalytic theory). My anticipated “nexus” of Literary, psychalogical [sic], and philosophical enchantment has all along (for many years) presumed an anthropological background; but that’s a long story.

4 | Dynamics of disclosure are integral to our anthropology (cultural evolution), as well as to 20th century phenomenology. Emergentness is integral to contemporary science, as well as to Derridean literary philosophy (according to Peggy Kamuf); so too for Derrida the notion of arrival, which belongs to the primordial futurity of time and the child—and the Inner Child of creativity.

5 | My own growth is entranced by appeals—and the notion of appeal (and appellant cohering)—in being drawn into telic self reflection or project-iveness.

6 | There is such a “thing” as Goodness in our evolving (I will further argue—which, I see this week, Steven Pinker is now arguing extensively, as do other rational optimists, such as economist Charles Kenny, as well as the famous Sen-Nussbaum legacy of public policy).

But I digress.

7 | The end of last April, I applied my cherished inner-/outer differencing to scenic (or dramaturgical) understanding, briefly (online; extensively in private) through “showing growth, growing the show” (¶s 9 and 11). (You’re so interested in all this, so I’ll hurry along.) I’m surprised that, in my early-May discussion of “a sense of Self / [inter]personal difference,” I barely mentioned inner-/outer differencing, merely referring to “inner differencing of psychal complexity” (¶4). But still-undiscussed innerworldliness led part 4 of “Elations....,” as if recent weeks have been a gradual withdrawal into beloved autumn (which becomes a loved, long spring of mind in rainy winter). Lastly, the end of September:

Bravery may be required, especially for women, to stand for one’s ownmost life (an inner-directing basis for outer-directed life) when the ecology trains one to feel otherwise (an outer-directing basis for inner-directed life). [9.30.11]

So seeing myself in you (which astounds and confuses you), I find you in myself, as if I don’t know the difference.

8 | Haunting the background of all I’ve written in recent days (across all the sections—written over several days) is a resonance of phenomenality and psychality that’s post-subjectivist, but can easily seem untenable relative to rampant egoism in our backgrounds. But there’s no problem, I think, associating inner-directedness with psychality and outer-directedness with what there seems to be, which is always at least (indisputably) phenomenal (i.e., experienced as more than oneself experiencing; we have good reason to not believe that life is but a dream).

9 | Extending each into modes of inquiry: Psychality is the “object” (subject) of psychology (obviously), most richly introspective as Analytical Psychology (a hybrid descendent of Jungian psychoanalysis, which serves for me as exemplar of psychological aspiration, not as a basis for my understanding of psychality), which easily merges into Literary studies (e.g., the middle of the last century through Northrop Frye’s “Archetypal Criticism,” then various applications of psychoanalysis to Literature, as exemplification of psychal-literary aspiration). Accordingly, my psychalanalytic interests are not like psychoanalytical interests, like cognitive theory of Literature is not a psychotherapeutic.

10 | Inquiry into phenomenality tends toward natural science (or formally model-theoretic inquiry that seeks as much replicable empirical substantiation as possible). An analytical psychology (in a highly aspirational generic sense) would like as much scientific basis as it can muster, but what’s especially psychal is essentially mindal, to which normal/natural science has little substantive access (beyond cognitive neuroscience). So, if there’s to be a “new consilience” between the humanities and the sciences, it won’t be strictly scientific; yet, it will be about the “nature” (Theory and philosophy) of “mind.”

11 | Phenomenality pertains to introspection in its own way, and phenomenality pertains to outer-directed examination in its own way. Piaget famously (but misleadingly) called the child “a little scientist,” exploring the world with such curiosity (but with so much interest in making new things, worlds, like little artists). Since then, cognitive science about science finds a continuum between the child’s enthusiasm and formal science (and anthropology finds Deep Time of the artist echoing in the child). In a sense, the ultimate mystery of being human is hidden but waiting in “evo-devo”ed presencing, ontogenic time, be it innerworldly (e.g., imaginative) or outerworldly (a remembered present), altogather phenomenally growing out of pre-differentiated mind into manifold comprehensibilities. And the nature of the consilience, I think, is the “textuality” of nature: bioglyphic and semiotic for discursive cohering.

12 | All in all, phenomenology is analytical psychology (in a generic sense) applied to phenomenality. The original philosophy of this (Husserl and his lineage) was a search for what became cognitive science, but in available terms of philosophical tradition. The appeal of Phenomenology (as a historical school of thought) rightly dissolves into phenomenology of cognitive science and literary humanities—cognitive humanities, one could usefully say. (I’m not much interested in the history of philosophy before, say, 1990. Or rather, I’d want to read history through a bouquet or interplay of contemporary lenses.)

Anyway, I’m fascinated by liminalities of phenomenal life itself: imaginability irt perception, fictionality irt realism. It’s luscious!

13 | Journalism is called upon to give narrative form to advents of the day, as if events have a real coherence.

Is “democracy” a nebulously-shared fiction (idealization of political life) whose reality depends on taking the story to heart?

14 | Do values die but for our presuming them to be living? What lives really that we don’t keep alive? What is worth our fidelity (or letting go), as our lives move on once per person, for every instance of being young, being in First Love (which cannot be the last?), being in a promising future (beautiful fiction made to last by way of its own character? or else willfully, fated to be outgrown?), learning to love new eras (thereby enriching one’s conception of Life), and gaining richness in aging (not just getting old), where—to my mind— the horizoning Child (we all are, archetypally) is drawn more wholly into Our humanity?

15 | I guess I’m not going out on much of a limb, except that I’m supposing (implicitly—work to come!) an unprecedented tree (inverted bush) of our evolving presence trying so preciously to comprehend our Supreme Fiction that will carry us fruitfully, progressively across centuries?

The older I get, the more that people seem like darling primates nearer to our animal background than civil pretenses want to appreciate. (That’s not about the avaricious animal we rightly exclude, rather the minding animal we became.) Doing anthropology gets more and more immanent to the daily round. Finding “the” elusive Story of being in time is not about a distant past, but a Deep Time echoing in quotidian emergences. We’re so funny and heartrending, I want to live forever to see more stories in stories.

I love the assonance of inworldness, inwardness, and inwordness.

I understand why poetics matter (beyond the poets, I think) where poiesis lives beyond any verse, where the history of philosophy leads beyond the demise of metaphysicalism (and Holocaust) into a rigorously poetic way, still undisclosed (or made), of thinking all we are.

So much for “a sense of inworldness.”


  Be fair. © 2017, gary e. davis