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In astutely other-oriented interaction, such as one-to-one teaching (e.g., classical philosophical tutorial) or psychological counseling (which may become a therapeutic alliance), there’s an enablative and educational interest that is different than astutely reasoning for oneself.
So, I distinguish ‘thinking’ and ‘reasoning’ for that purpose. Obviously, the two are usually synonyms, but that’s because an important difference between other-oriented and self-interested thinking/reasoning is not implied or interesting
or recognizable.
The difference is especially relevant inasmuch as [i] one person (teacher, counselor) is in the Janus-faced condition of appropriating an understanding (or text) relative to the other’s evident degree of engagement (so-called “level” of development); or [ii] one person (student, client) is challenged to better understand relative to their own interest, project, or/and life.
One [i] is for being with the other better; one [ii] is with the other for being oneself better. So, a stipulative difference in terms is a very important difference of interaction. This difference can be symbolized relative to my discussion “on conceptualizing” as [3] <—> [4]
(When Heidegger starkly and simply wrote, in Being and Time, that “Dasein ist Mitsein”—There-being is With-being—he had in mind thinking, as teachers or therapists should need to understand being “there.” Indeed, the only time that he ever made Sein und Zeit the focus of a seminar was with a group of psychiatrists. Otherwise, “what is called thinking” [a lecture course] was about teaching to think as teaching thinking or thinking that teaches—albeit relative to the history of philosophy, his interest.)
Relative to oneself, the difference is important, too, as if one is another—learning from oneself (“self reflection”) or finding oneself mirrored in another (person, phenomenon). Phenomenology is best understood relative to thinking (Heidegger) rather than relative to reasoning (Husserl). In thinking for oneself, reasoning (in a normal sense) is appropriated to reflection and/or reconstructive understanding for the sake of one’s ownmost interest and authentic life.
Teaching and counseling think for the sake of the other’s individuation.
On the one hand, [ii] feeling a dilemma is an inspiring moment for thinking—or can be. On the other hand, [i] inspiring regard for a dilemma as appealing and surmountable is a rewarding moment for teaching.
Together, we may better understand how differentiation is about relativity of context and interest—enframing a phenomenon (other) relative to a criterion or enstancing a point (posture) relative to an interest.
Criticism in the humanities is primarily about better understanding, relative to interpretative frames and project-ive interests. A polemical point is primarily a differential point.
Understanding or posturing interests of criticism as negate-ive “critique” is a special mode of criticism which is often inappropriate (if not symptomatic of desire to harm), but properly dramactional for the sake of emancipatory interest. But emancipatory interest which is not motivated by constructive understanding leaves an emancipated view in a netherspace or in disorientation that unwittingly fosters desire for an anchor (e.g., an easy resort for orientation, such as ready ideology). The disorientation may be a great chance for creativity, but thinking that enables creativity through criticism is standing for trust in the other’s capability, not negating their engagement.
However—and needless to say—enough of the world calls for exposé that one can easily fill a career of punditry. The following list merely tropes the vast scale of phoniness that persons can embody. The chatter of inauthenticity is massive.
- Avowals of objectivity cloak selectivity of foci in representing an issue. Such is the currency of political theatrics (or phony theater—contrary to the reality that life is commonly genuine theater). A tone of dispassionate, evidence-based belief masks uninformed choice of interpretive policy.
- Avowals of genuineness cloak the posturing of a “spin doctor,” as with public relations agents or trial attorneys in heartful summation to a jury—or academic opinions by reason of “authority” (self-authorization to speak outside of one’s speciality without evidence because one is an accepted authority-in-general; this happens commonly in professions outside of academia), regardless of concern for validity of backing.
- Postures of commitment mask token efforts, empty symbols, and impulsive policies. This applies to opinionated writing (e.g., pundits writing to deadline) as much as to reviews of others’ work (column limits imposted by editors who must respect pre-sold space for what really matters: the ads).
- Oversimplification of issues caters to casual others’ desire for comfortable explanation. Pretenses of transparency are really scenes of communicative marketing.
- Complaint of ad hominem attack masks threat to personal investment in self-serving positions (e.g., academic positions which are vital to one’s reputation, thus willfully immunized from re-thinking).
- Predatory interest masks itself with concern for the other’s interest (e.g., high-stake sales). “Just doing business” is too often bait-and-switch. Or market interest prevails over interest in admirable value (e.g., many commercial books; or arcane academic tomes primarily serve interest in tenure, which sell to tens of academic libraries because the university press has standing orders for whatever they publish).
- Journalism may be more interested in “eyeballs” than public good, so sensationalism hawks itself as urgency, and a profession becomes increasingly “tabloid” video and digital “push.” (“Stay tuned for more dramatic mayhem—when we come back.”)
- Facing a good rule is something to be managed, not oriented by. Law is to be dealt with, rather than respected. Getting around the law without appearing to regard oneself as above the law is par for the course in many attorney-client relationships. The businessman sees a jungle, so “whatever it takes” that one can get away with is felt to be acceptable. One is not above faking data in research, faking scholarship in argument, for the sake of career.
- And also, there are fallacies in reasoning that serve implicit defense against [re]thinking.
Yet, also there is appropriate irreverence which may hurt others’ feelings, as a matter of polemic, which has its place, but never as intent to harm. However, polemic that threatens another’s vanity can be dangerous for the polemicist’s relationship. We don’t want the other to flee.
We don’t want intractible defensiveness in teaching and counseling.
And how many colleagues have been “severanced” (or failed to get tenure) because they were just too “there”? (I had a friend who failed to get tenure because he was an organizer for the university division of the American Federation of Teachers. Another friend failed to get tenure because his peer-esteemed scholarship was too “radical” for his conservative department. Both may be somewhat at fault for lacking skill in being politic)
Decency, graciousness, and felicity—being in good touch with the other—is essential for astute thinking that is really that: effective, individuative, emancipatory, therapeutic, educational, or exemplary and admirable.
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