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  an epilogue: evolving itself
gary e. davis
August 20, 2017

In the previous sections, ‘evolving’ and related terms haven’t been used (except for global titling of this second part of “mind evolving”), let alone venturing to define the notion. I’ve mentioned “evolution” earlier, but only in passing. That was quite deliberate, because I understand evolving relative to some sense of progressivity, and understand the latter in terms of some sense of bridging prospects for wholly flourishive life and ecologically thriving humanity. So, “evolving” is that.

But the rubric ‘evolving’, in the rubric “evolving demic efficacy” and “mind evolving” is enactive (transitive), not passive (intransitive). We normally regard ‘evolving’ as something that happens (intransitive), even rather trivially: large scale change; at best, large scale development. That’s reconstructive. But the original sense was enactive, albeit trivially so (Merriam-Webster Unabridged): “to unfold, disclose by degrees, emit, derive, educe, work out or develop.”

Also, the normal, intransitive notion—when not trivial—is biologized (i.e., primarily pertaining to “nature”). But this causes a rather humorous transitive definition, as if nature has intentions: “to develop or produce by natural evolutionary processes.” Who/What develops or produces, in a transitive sense? (the gods, of course, i.e., our personifications of nature: finding purpose).

Actually, the modern sense of evolution followed British senses of progress in the 19th century. In the wake of notions of social progressivism and the advent of Darwin’s work, notions of “social darwinism” were advanced as naturalized conceptions of progress (initially via Herbert Spencer). I have no interest in that (except relative to interest in historiography). Also, the earlier notions of progress are irrelevant here. But prospecting notions of progress has been part of philosophy of evolution. That also is irrelevant here. Yet, it’s relevant to recognize that etymography is a linguistic adjunct of historiography.

Understanding human evolution relative to some—let’s say—generative psychological conception of human flourishing has no precedent, which I note because I’ve been “plagued” for years to derive a satisfactory cohering enhancement of a few others’ work (that I’ve mentioned earlier: Hull, Sternberg, Gardner, and Csikszentmihalyi—yet, many others) that has not been brought into generative interplay. The entire “mind evolving” set of discussions so far (in this ongoing closure of Cycle 1 of is for the sake of later dwelling with cited work of others and in light of more recent work.

In other words, my conception of evolving is developing relative to advents of others’ work, and that is integral to the notion itself, as gather-al communion, so to speak, of inquiries, potential synergies, and discursive prospects for appropriative fruitfulness in light of evidentiary conceptual adventuring. Earlier fun was preliminary (but implicitly anticipates current discussion).

I’m ready now to begin again, though the next, last part of this Cycle 1 of “mind evolving”—”some presence”—will be conceptual play (and nowhere near the serious fun I anticipate for later Cycles).


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