I earlier claimed that phenomenality about persons, events, and things is an abstraction from articulation which belongs to persons, events, and things themselves. But abstraction is useful, of course. Phenomenal analysis (phenomenology)—which is “about…a present of presencing as resonant presence” (earlier here)—is useful for articulating aspects of experience relative to contexts, attitudes, categoriality, inter-experiential modes, inter-modal relations, multi-modal appreciations, etc.—especially isomorphisms—which can result in useful new coherences, tropes, concepts, constellations of understanding, creative prospecting, etc.

Any of that always implies a life belonging there—or analysis is only as good as a life can feel belonging with it. Phenomena belong, in principle, to lives whose psychality is oneSelf in selfidentical, [inter]personal, cultural, conceptual, social, and political relations. And we commonly multiply the modes, which are normal domains of inquiry: family, neighborhood, community, professional, economic, historical, anthropic, etc.

So, a phenomenological interest in psychality is more than analysis motivated by dysfunction (psychoanalysis). Non-congestive life can be as intricately analyzable as congestive life because—I would argue—variable s/p differentiation of selfidentity commonly involves useful Self mirroring (though commonly unnoticed) in perception of persons, events, and things, which is analytically concealed by notions of subjectivism (focal for psychoanalysis). Individuational learning (especially creativity) welcomes psychal depth/background [S] showing to oneself as part of an event, person. or thing: Ambiguously differentiated S/s difference plays into better articulation, complemented by better appreciation of what belongs to the event, person, or thing itself. One can be enriched or inspired without losing appreciation for the integrity of persons, an event itself, a thing itself.

That’s not about displaced subjections of oneSelf relevant to psychoanalytic interest; rather, about a creative dynamic in learning—which also serves useful directions for inquiry. Standard notions of self as subjectivity conceal one’s capacity to differentiate accurately (in letting phenomena emerge their own way), interact autonomously (in letting the inter-ality be enlightening), and manage self/other difference fairly, as well as fruitfully. That’s not a proper venue for classical psychoanalysis (which is why C. G. Jung split from Freud). The better basis for psychotherapy is a generative psychalogy applied to therapeutic alliances.