free associations • gary e. davis • berkeley


	Project

	free associations of a nomadic species an appeal of gardening types and kinds gary e. davis	June 25, 2024

Daily life usually stays casual because the sociality of time (The Clock) fills the day with ephemoral episodes (so much busyness!), thus excluding long focus on significants, curiosities, rich possibilities, mysterious complexities, etc. Persons who welcome time for dwelling seem relatively rare, and their making time seems rarer.

But special areas of life have their own normal niche or resort, usually because
a highly differentiated market requires that: professions, academia, business technicalities, etc. Specialty domains are “species” of resort.

A highly individuated life is a sui generis psychalness, “instituted” by the continuity of its times composing a nebulous selfidentity, having in principle a specifiable “historicity” within shared “historicality” (Being and Time).

Cultural domains may be usefully understood as instituted species of mentality (beyond ethnicities).

Conceptualities may tend to imply paradigms of thinking, often associated with
a canonical voice or highly individuated influence.

Are stable trends in society species of sociality?—in any case being only coarsely discernible by statistical means.

We readily classify politics into historical kinds, which are species of politic (monarchal, autocratic, communal, parliamentary, bicameral).

The entirety of humanity can be usefully parsed into psychal, cultural, conceptual, social, and political genera. Each genus can be discerned to have primary, primal, and possibly primordial (i.e., fundamentally conceptual) discernibility, relative to one’s ability to discern distinctions, one’s discernability.

But caring about a non-biological inflation of species is “academic.”

Biology is irreducible to physicality.

Mentality emerges singularly from neurobiology, irreducible to a retrojective narrative of a given mentability’s genesis.

Modeling a (the?) genealogy of psychalness doesn’t capture primal psychal genesis, let alone the individuation allowing for such special inquiry.

Human intelligence—person-al mind—is a species of inestimably heterogenous being (as such: manifold mentability itself) whose “phenotypes” are individualities which may tend toward archetypal, historical degrees of flourishing (i.e., sui generis mentability).

We have only partial clinical stories of the exponential flowering of infant mentability. And child developmental psychology is no more refined than an educational psychology of “grade level” capability, which standardly stops in adolescence because the exponential flowering of special capability becomes comprehensible only relative to the domains of inquiry which become specialties, typified by established academic domains. Adult “developmental” modeling melds into the parsable (can be parsed) evolutionarity of domains and conceptualities.

Though mentability is importantly biosubjective (subject to its metabolic health), high mental health is capable of prevalently-downward causality, such that its individuation not only advances its health, but makes a life which has nothing
to do with that metaholic control: a singular life, a selfidentity with echoes of encultured archetypal character embodied by selfidentical, life-oriental value domains (singularly individuated psychalness).

So, by the way, analyses of brain/mind interfacing seem to me rather quaint, though standardly very technical.

How a selfidentity is singularly parsable is only coarsely understandable in terms of standard character types, being a person whose intersectionality (psychal, cultural, conceptual, and social) for a given life is always singular: no more spcecifiable than biographical analysis, at best as narrative art (which Heidegger surmised eight decades ago).

Beyond myths of “ontology,” a person shows begenic kinds of being which are species of conceptuality (conceptualized mentability) melded “meta”-conceptually (a higher scale of conceptuality: interdomainal) with psychal, cultural, and social sensibility as oneSself.

Such a continuum of differences can serve pragmatic interest in aptly holistic focus (proximal constitutivity), known reflectively by implicature, as conceptual interality (background domain horizoning or relevant parametering). In other words, we have good reason to think of living holism being at least that differentiated, showing useful gravities.

Academic domains are instituted in terms of constitutive specialties, their guild species showing through journals which serve evolving niches across special geographies (“distributed mind” in cognitive science, tropographies in literary life).

We mental creatures are so far beyond biological speciation that the notion of Homo sapiens conceals our vastly plural (and “spiritually” planetary) personity, which is usefully parsed as a simple continuum of lifecycle modes or gravities,
but which, to me, trope Our mysterious intelligence evolving Itself: Gaic Earth unwittingly evincing differential, yet bounded, intelligibility of Itself.

Anthropological thinking can’t capture the Gaic condition—that ultimate intersectionality—other than to retrojectively define itself relative to that real, lived interdomainity which historically aspired (19th century) to explicate a singularity of being anthropic, but which is relative to the intelligability which is to be understood, then retrospectively explained. Conversely, the controversial notion of the Anthropocene techno-biologizes Our evolving intersectionality. Anthropic thinking dissolves into the unprecedented, evolving interdomainity of studies which are explained in their own terms. A fair conception of Our post-naturalistic, philological evolution of intelligibility (“realism” of intelligability) serves conceptual interest which seeks to design itself because person-al mentability is intrinsically futural: oriented by appeals of life to come, anticipating generations that will either appreciate the good ancesters or forget us, if they survive.

Every guild has its own version of that proximal continuum—psychal, cultural, conceptual, social, and political—aspiring to be effectively historical—"being-historical thinking” (Heidegger)—being an instituted inter-specie-al designing of resourced and resourceful resorts (to be so much reserved standing amid “standing reserves” [Heidegger] which feed markets).

A specialist work, with its large bibliography, implicitly displays a topical resort which may be an eponymous world of its own, a species of discourse in the world proffering a singular conception of Our world, in some useful sense (especially realtive to a special audience)—though often serving to merely secure career advancement or serve a profitable opportunity. (So much scholarship becomes mere allusion to its availability, if not forgotten.)

Scholarly work expresses a specific humanity—significant scholarly work may express a species of humanity—such that its authorial singularity expresses an evolving mentality which possibly plays in time, via manifold audiences, with other works to be drawn into hybrid constellations, thanks to free associative dwelling (“release” into “regionings of that which regions,” says elder Heidegger, the “letting be” of younger Being and Time) with, in, by, and for our specieal aspiring to more-intelligently evolve, I find among many Flow-ers.