gedavis.com	aspects of being well	The Project

	conceptual aspects of being gary e. davis	February 18, 2019

In discussions above, I’ve mentioned concepts and distinctions for the sake of introducing themes for later dwelling here, not pretending that discussion is always clear. For example, why pose a distinction between Self and self? Well, what’s the difference between (a) being the largely-nonconscious futurity of a whole life always ongoing and (b) being (having) a cohering sense of selfidentity near-term? (The self-enactional cohering is self-understood as a coherence, yet...). It’s like the contemplated difference between depth psychology of individuated years of a life and that life’s preconscious (easily articulated) sense of “self” nowadays. living relationality: Infant attachment becomes self-differentiating child attachment (the well-researched “separation/individuation” dynamic). Then individuation outgrows that—more or less—while the “backstage” sense of attachmentality (interSelfality) which individuates into teen and emerging adult versions continues to echo early attachment, more or less. Such feeling of being with melds with deliberate relationship, under differentiating, over differentiating, mirroring oneself, mirroring oneSelf (confronting one with the unwitting other in that experience?), more or less. That’s not about cognition. Is psychology which attaches itself to cognitive science a mental science that self-conceals relationality? Would a synthesis of (a) well-understood relationality, from clinical relational psychodynamics, and (b) cognitive psychology be a very different psychalogy? If “interpersonal intelligence” is distinguishable from other modes of intelligence, what is mental science beyond a conceptual hegemony of cognition (representationality)? ontogeny of conceptuality: A standard distinction between categorial type and token (e.g., self as such—in concept—and “me”) presumes the capability of making categorial differentiations, as well as distinguishing levels of categoriality (a set-theoretical notion). The capability is a different kind of concept (diachronic, let’s say) from a container (synchronic) with included instances. The so-called “origin” of concepts—whatever the kind—is individuated, ontogenic. Conceptuality isn’t primarily given or magically emerging structurally from mental development. Overt conceptuality emerges from accomplished capabilities which are Accomplished (individuated from born capacities), not that a capability is a meta-concept in some deep structural sense. Rather, ordinary concepts are derived modes of capability efficacy. Or so some recent researchers of intelligence and conceptuality do prospect. next—> furthermore

 

 

Be fair. © 2019, gary e. davis