Spring Points
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Spring Points |
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| The S/s/p-differential venture called “phenomenology” gary e. davis |
June 2020 |
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Assaying and clarifying phenomenality is phenomenographical: “graphing” what a phenomenality “is” for onself with the other. One is commonly considering “things” in such ventures, yet the primal and primary relationality is with other persons, hallmarked with things by the vastly ordinary personification of them, often due to ordinary language presuming intentionality, because language serves intentional beings. (Recall the amoeba that “hunts and kills,” like the wind blows.) Since generating meaning and significance is always part of construing meaning and significance, phenomenogeny is implied by phenomenography, like being is implied by being, and presencing by a present. That implicature may evince from the historicality of there being phenomenality or from the historicity of one’s interest (or imaginative, prospective desire). Phenomenology is about the liminality of phenomenogeny and phenomenography, as presence is the liminality of presencing and presents. A fundamental error of Husserlian phenomenology was its motivation by the presence of objects rather than by others. So, Husserl struggled unsuccessfully to understand “intersubjectivity” (a bogus notion, based on a bogus sense of Self as subjectivity) in light of analyses of relations to objects mapped into “transcen-dental logic.” A fundamental innovation by Heidegger was that primary relationality is with others: “Dasein ist Mitsein”: Therebeing is with-being. A profoundly misleading tradition of Heidegger scholarship (led by Hubert Dreyfus) resulted from reading Heidegger in light of Husserlian thinking. That led to a generation of scholarship that conceals the hermeneutical <–> appropriative relationality of Heidegger’s teaching. I think this could be made very evident through a close reading of Heidegger’s short essay “My Way to Phenomenology,” On Time and Being, which is about leaving behind “Phenomenology,” traditionally understood. It’s easy for me to recognize systematic concealment of “the” other in objectivist scholarship by Dreyfus’s “children” and by scholars who confuse the difference between philosophical and biographical analysis, the latter projecting conceptual dependencies (to be debunked) from piecemeal engagement with philosophical texts, as if intellectual history is philosophy by another name (e.g., Richard Polt, Richard Wolin, Peter Gordon, Peter Trawny, Charles Baumbach, and others). That’s dramatically exemplified by readers of Heidegger’s Unterlegungen (Considerations) who regard outtakes in the development of a critical phenomen-ology (engaged with textual phenomenality) as being subjective confessions (engaged with secret beliefs). My digression there (away from prospecting “appreciable phenomenality”) intimates that a large scale background is implicit to my heuristic venturing. No wonder my prospecting elsewhere sometimes seems confusedly obscure (which is inevitable in prospecting—publicly inviting better sense from others!); for instance, writing “one’s enframing as no better than one’s enstancing,” in prospecting replacement of ‘is’ with ‘as’. Or saying of interpsychal (inter-selfal) phenomenality that “enframing an entrancing time reflects that I’ve enstanced myself as our interface, though as if there’s no ‘inter-‘ at all…” Those are notes of phenomenal appeal, not intending to be conceptually poetic, but having an integrity of figurative (tropical) language that I would defend (yet welcome moving beyond). There’s no conceptual aestheticism in prospecting phenomenal appeal. So I write of receptiveness and responsiveness obscurely. So what? So, what can be made of giving up ‘is’, spring 2017?:
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| Be fair. © 2020, gary e. davis |