home page literary living
showing growth, growing the show
notes on storial sensibility and developmental interest
April 24, 2011

1 | If the following is called a presentation of notes, it’s likely considered OK that everything doesn’t yet formally cohere. (The notes don’t yet compose a singular composition.) Notes are promissory—not, by the way, thereby excusing myself from values of well formed presentation (which is ideally discursive, implying values of formal coherence). However, my notes do seem to cohere.

2 | We want narrative coherence. Not all presentational coherence is narrative, but we especially like narrative presentations. A well-ordered array of information may not be narrative (e.g., a taxonomical presentation). Clarifying something may not be narrative (e.g., gaining exactness about a significance of meaning).

3 | Narrative has a telic aura (or implicature) of presentation, presenting itself as if going somewhere (not merely as if, but actually going somewhere, if the writer doesn’t want to lose the reader’s expectational interest in the As If of good faith engagement). Reading evokes presenting, as if the narrative is presenting itself going somewhere.

4 | All activity has a telic aura—more than aura: a telic coherence; and narrative is a presentational activity, inheriting the telicness of all action for the sake of its “pathiness” of presentation.

5 | Not all narratives are storial: engaged in presenting a story—storying, storiational. Reports, essays, and analyses are commonly narrative, but lack the temporal engagement or relativity (sequenced scenes, moments, days, etc.) that stories have. To be storial is to be happening in the happening of narrating—more than that: likely happening through scenes, happening scenically (or as if a scenicness belongs to the ongoing).

6 | Scenes are bounded (or boundaried) environments implying storial containment, even when the storiality of a scene is unknown. An environment seems like a scene because storiality is at least connoted.

7 | Not every bounded environment is storial. An ecology is a bounded environment (nebulously so, as a discursive or scientific claim about an environment). Landscapes are “scenic,” in an unbounded sense, but not storial: Their appeal is partly the expansive openness of the presence, as if boundless or implying appeals of boundlessness.

8 | The appeal of a contained landscape (as most all are) is an embrace of its boundedness, like the appealing cogency of belonging to an estate or comprehending a garden as self-contained, showing an identity that can be contained or comprehended in its designedness (i.e., not as the design it has—which may so far be beyond one’s understanding—but as its susceptibility, in principle, to having comprehensible design which constitutes its singularity). A valley expresses a sense of identity or singularity in its bounds, as if scenic for our belonging to it (or it to us).

9 | A scene is not fully ecological, though maybe its implicit story is. I’m playing with differences for the sake of giving resonance to an interest in scenic understanding. All I’ve mentioned above is especially associable with outer-directing (tangible) scenicness (the intangible significance that tangibility may have). Yet, the richness a scene may have is especially due to the inner-directing (that intangible) sense we may bring to it, finding storial potential, as well as perceiving what a scene may really, unto itself (outer-directingly), already have (imply or entail). A scene may be a resonance, a liminality of outer- and inner-worldliness for psychally perceiving potentials and background in a mix of imaginative remembrance evinced as “the” scene. Educed remembrance in the scene may weave into “perceived” potentials (telic imaginability) to give a scene a prevailing storiality or bearing of which the scene is an entrance, threshold, or liminality.

10 | Storial implicature of the scene gives a potential to interacting persons—to their observable inter-behavioral context (which is never actually split off from being activity, i.e., always having intentions or ongoing intentionality, being never mere behavior in an objective context). The implicature (or aura) of the scene may be anticipatory, anticipating an ongoingness beyond its bounds: a promise or prospectiveness. Or (and) the aura may be a background, implying an earlier episode or legacy of significance (typical of normative and functional organizations of interaction).

11 | So, regarding a context relative to scenic understanding could be called (as I’ve done for years) ensiting: Enactive understanding of a context as situation can be understanding—enactively, not imputing a given state of affairs—of a context as site-ation, especially as scenic. There “is” an inherence to contexts of explicit/implicit difference (outer-/inner-, foreground/background, surface/depth) that grants to contexts a possibly integral resonance or bearing of liminality that serves their potential—letting contexts show in their own way—as well as serving inquirial or creative interests of understanding. Finding storial implicature or potential in a scene is not to make the scene into part of a story. It’s not about mapping a given story into a context, rather about letting a context have its own way as storial interest. Storial implicature or potential of a scene suggests storial directions it may take (ambiguously going forward, but part of an ongoingness, one way or another); or suggests storial background a context may have (one of several options, nebulously retrievable). The general feature of contexts having explicit/implicit differentiation is especially interesting (or, at least, near to mind presently) as storial potential inasmuch as a context is part of a living world which is ours, i.e., lived in time: anticipating and backgrounding, broadening and building, from emerging presence.

12 | A person’s prevailing anticipation is relative to where their activity is going or what they’re doing. Yet, the horizon of that is their life, which is (or ought to be) understood as always developing, as lifelong learning is part of living well (and long). Understanding ourselves as ever developing is integral to my sense of persons.

[This is beyond regarding persons as unconditional “ends” unto themselves, since the ongoingness of a happily engaged life, for the sake of higher individuation or ever-ongoing enrichment, is a flourishing open-endedness, which makes little sense as an end unto itself. I don’t regard a teen’s potential as an End. I don’t regard a friend’s talent as an End. The researching artist, scientist, inquirer, or entrepreneur will not likely see their engagement as an End, rather—relative to the rubric—as an open-ending or ongoing Openness into whichever emerging paths better appeal, no more a means to an end than a journey presumes what’s beyond a horizon.]

13 | So, the storiality of a person in a scene is lifeworldly—at best (to my mind) developmentally so—and our interplay is a weave of growing paths, at best influencing each other’s pathmaking like gravities, thereby (at best, possibly) changing each other’s life. That’s an idealization of interaction, as if there is important storiality in what we do together. Of course, the storiality of a scene is usually minute, if discernible at all: Our days are readily filled with countless functionalities and normalcies that come and go forgettably. But scenes, as such, may hold potential which limited time disallows.

14 | I’m expressing my bias for developmental interest—of the other and my own developmental interest in the other, which depends (to my mind) on really understanding (trying to understand) their developmentality, so to speak. In specific scenes, that can be a matter of the zone of what makes sense, relative to the time we have. Maintaining constructive rapport can be an art. Friendship, teaching, and creative collaboration call for constructive rapport (so far beyond functional maintaining of useful relations which is typical of office life or organizational life generally).

15 | A scene has a zone of proximal understanding, whereby constructive rapport is easy to continue. Yet, persons have—relative to an issue—a zone of proximal development and a variable readiness to broaden or/and build on what they understand. An interactive scene has a potential for self-enhancive understanding that is horizonal (potentially broadening) and project-ive (potentially building, e.g., capability). Dramatic stories commonly imply issues facing their boundaries (i.e., persons facing issues as if the issues themselves are interfacing boundaries); so, a mundane scene may have dramatic potential.

16 | When it’s said that a person has a “complex,” that probably means an array of issues that depend on each’s boundaries for the coherence of each issue (or person!) in the self efficacy of an ongoing life (or self-efficacy of interpersonal activity). The undevelopmentality of a mundane scene may easily (to an inquirer, a writer, a teacher) imply a potential inter-developmentality that is excluded and which might be read to prevail as the important potential of the interaction (though participants are excommunicating their potential, due to lacking time or readiness).

17 | The storiality of a scene may be its potential developmentality of interaction. Inasmuch as happily meaningful engagement is the prevailing telos of one’s life, thus potentially for interaction, then potentials of inter-developmentality may be the best potential storiality of scenes.

18 | That is integral to art. Entering a context artfully includes always already desiring to understand scenically, especially developmentally (as living artfully is always already a creative fidelity to lifelong learning).

19 | The potential of zones for development (implied by zones of proximal understanding) is a deeper appreciability (building) of things (contexts, events), as well as better appreciation (broadening, heightening) of what’s between us, as if the heart of ethical life is ideally (looking for chances to be) an artistry of inter-promoting creativity and individuation. Mutuality of interest in development can be the prevailing background (the orienting Value) of interaction. Scenic understanding can be practically idealized as developmental situation (expressing background interest in learning never ending) where a zone of proximal understanding may entrance into a zone of proximal development (furtherance of learning), which may entrance into a zone of deeper appreciability, belonging to “my” (one’s) interest in developing (through the other) as also my interest in the other’s development.

20 | Developmental temporality gives prevalence to possibility (futurity) over given background in a present, a context, a scene. A short note I made to myself, which the above backgrounds (still obscure it may be to share) was: Scenic understanding of the other can be an issue-complex developmental emplacement (per issue, yet also as complex). Though the point of interaction is usually purposive, collaborative, functional, or expressive, issue-complex developmental temporality is commonly implied by a scene, as if learning (by myself, as well as by the other) and teaching (by the other, as well as by myself) are always possible. [What am I going to do about having thousands of notes that only I understand?

continued at “rock of ages”]