There would be such play (intermodalizing), relative to a specific convening—some literary dinner party.

There will be grand bibliophilia—as if voices appearing together in a focused anthology emerged in light of interplay with all others—voices as facets of a domain composed by—emergent of—their interplaying presence with, in, and to each other.

But abstractly, concepts become the parts of interplay. Yet, that matters relative to lives—lifeworldliness (varieties of living domains). Concepts are like persons at least because concepts matter relative to lives; and lives of persons matter more to us than lives of non-persons and non-living things.

A logic of concepts shares with persons the phenomenalogicality of experience generally, which is proximally composed of interpsychal relations (early childhood onward), from which we derive senses of non-personal things (often personified),
and we abstract from experience (often in terms of “nature” enacting; or oneself being acted upon by forces that have as-if intent).

The world of lives give purpose, with, in, and to others and things, with, in, and to
our dwelling conceptually; and conceptuality serves that: purposeful lives with, in, for, and to themselves.

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