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a creative life |
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philographical notes gary e. davis |
March 12 , 2019 September 5 |
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I love wording, which usually emerges from far more silence than time given to forming a phrase, even more when I have a reader in mind, because writing to myself in my own idiom is easy. Enstancing myself for others calls for expli-cative clarity that I usually don’t require myself. “If he’d give more time to the matter, his letters would be shorter.” No wonder, then, that I may seem obsessed online with differences between auth-oriality and authorship. Writing itself tropes the hidden time before wording (as well as recursive revising). Derrida’s writing-in-speech is complemented by anyone’s thoughtful time-in-texting (which is a trace of genuine dwelling). So, you see, a distinction between writing and wording is important. “Wording” isn’t figurative (synecdochic?) for writing; rather a mode of the latter. (Wording is no matter of merely “texting.”) Analogously, there’s authorship in interpersonal presence, not only imputed other self from their personal stance of interaction. Real difference between self-presence (enstancing oneself in the interpersonal relation) and unrepresented background Selfality of a futural life being presently is there. Indeed, Derrida’s writing-in-speech is attuned to Heidegger’s notion of there-being as relational (“Mitsein”), distinct from “Self” (existentiality? in Being and Time). Self is importantly distinguishable from “self” (selfidentity?) in B&T because manifold interpersonal selfidentity is a centripetally present-oriented, proximal sense of existential time (merely lived year, lived month, day, hour) that tends to conceal the full temporality of life orientation (given that one is living authentically) beyond relations with others and things ordinarily. The “ecstatic quotidian” (everyday aesthetics?) is a proximal appeal of fully felt time being. Oneself is really a text for another and to oneself as well. So, can literary admiration be any better than one’s facility with appreciating another actual person in one’s life?—or oneself being there? Conversely, can literary enrichment (thanks to opening into—giving oneself to— its fourfolding, let’s say) find its way to enrich being with each other? That’s surely a keynote of literary education. Moreover, intimacy with a text is like intimacy with oneself: drawn into the appeal of the other as the other to enhance appreciation of being oneself. That’s no matter of assimilating the other into one’s comfortable horizon. Indeed, who wants that from art! Appreciating the other in their own way as possibly unprecedented may be inspiring? enlightening? enchanting? sobering? Can we count the ways? Of course, no. Reader, I want to realize you actualizing your aims and appreciate that as it is, as if I may become, as best I can, you: embodied life in imagining—not be be contained by “the embodied life of imagining” that is integral to The Life; rather to find actual horizonality enhanced. That implies a feeling for relations, for interplay whose nature isn’t in “roots,” but in futural time, where “embodied human cognition” derives from begenic feeling for interfacial presence, whose ongoing ecogenic individuation embraces “shaping our cognitive ecology” by advancing shareable comprehensibility. So, to my mind, imagination tropes emergent intelligibility served by imaginability which appreciates “envisioning in the mind’s eye and other imaginings” of a life. Imaginability’s active imagination can be (ideally) oriented by desire for enriching manifoldly multi-modal appreciability that echoes Our full being in Time, i.e., Our evolving. The artist—scientifically and otherwise—may live for the appeal of such ideality so far from mere imagining: innovating, engaging, and leaving a lasting mark on Earth. |
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Be fair. © 2019, gary e. davis |