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frametime
April 10, 2011


1 | A moment is captured in an image, say (or as a little narrative of text—though an image can be regarded as a little narrative, by guiding attention to all that’s selected). The capture freezes time, they say. The capturing frames the moment.

2 | The primary framing is the capture which results in an image that has boundaries. The boundaries of the image likely imply something outside the boundaries. (A self-contained image—not implying anything beyond itself—is the exception that likely calls attention to its self-containedness.) The primary framing is the given imposition of boundaries onto what likely has itself no such boundaries (surely itself having no annulment of time, which the capture invokes or induces). The primary framing of time and space precedes any overt frame. The instilling creates the overt, derivative, literal frame.

3 | Likewise—yet more simply—moving one’s hand involves the moving that results in the move (noun). The moving of the move (verb) yields the move (noun)—which might be altogether represented as the movement. There is the moving of the movement and the movement’s resultant move.

4 | I act and represent that as me acting. But actually, I is acting and me (“I,” to myself) knows that by representing it. I represent myself as me in “I.” To me, I’m the one who says “I.” But “I” is a representation enacted. I think “I”; I think of myself as “I,” and that same thinking of myself also says that I’m doing this or that, and you hear “I’m doing this or that.”

5 | The I/“I” difference could also be called the I/me difference, as I-acting is represented as I-the-enacting or I-the-acted or I-the-actor. In a sense, I may be the same to myself as I am to you, as I have notions of myself that one calls personality, and you might have a good sense of my personality. But likely, we’ll easily disagree about details of the same person, due to my advantages (knowing why I turned my head) and your advantages (seeing the back of my head as I can’t). I behave in ways I didn’t notice, and you did. You have advantages, but so do I. We may disagree about the “same” person, who happens to be me—to you, as well as to myself.

6 | Anyway, this I/me difference—acting/act, expressing/representation—is primal—but not inborn. It’s achieved: The infant discovers that the moving hand is “mine.” There’s I moving, not merely the movement witnessed. Things move, and some things “I” moves. This becomes very sophisticated (relative to infancy) as the I/me difference between be-ing myself and having sense of that (be-ing someone: myself to myself).

7 | One might say (usefully, validly) that acting is fulfilled in the act. I may be fulfilled in my sense of myself—which is a sense of my Self: so much time of Self realization in selfness (self efficacy of oneSelf) actualized in what one may say of me, I to myself, me to you. An enactivity is fulfilled.

8 | Yet, preceding enactivity is a givenness: given capacity, given capability (developed capacity), given desires, given anticipations, given knowledge, given memories—but especially: given situations “calling” for enacting some desire, anticipation, or purpose, albeit relative to given time: developmental time, partially inhabited by cultural time (partially inhabited by natural time, including anthropological and genomic time). Most awesome is the potential domain of givenness or The Given. Yet, relative to a life, the given is bounded, constrained, or enframed relative to one’s enactive interest seeking fulfillment.

9 | Any activity can be regarded relative to the background givenness (G), the enactive interest (E) and its fulfillment (F). Learning (:F) presumes motivating experience (:G) for trial-and-error (:E), anticipating (:G) good results (:F). Self esteem (:F) may be understood as resulting from pleasure (:G) in mastery (:E). Even intelligence as such (which ontogenically flourishes into an always-growing givenness for any activity) can be modeled as likewise 3-fold: knowledge-acquisition components (re: the givenness of the world which becomes given knowledge); performance components (re: the amplification of capability); and metacomponents (re: the recognition and assessment of fulfilled/not fulfilled performing). This 3-fold sense of intelligence is the basic character of the leading theory of core intelligence in academic psychology (which its originator, Robert Sternberg, calls the “triarchic theory of intelligence”; his linked book applies this longstanding theory to educational psychology).

10 | Another perspective on the same theory of intelligence is to regard contextual learning as a matter of “assimilation or shaping” (incorporation) of experience (:G) and “individuation or selection” (:E) resulting in “accomodation or adaptation.” But the modeling is recursive: Each aspect expresses results of all three aspects (like fractals, exemplified by a twig irt its branch irt its limb irt the tree—or the isomorphic difference between two instances [phenotypes] of the same species of tree [genotype]). From the generativity of the 3-fold (which gets categorially analytical at Sternberg’s micro-level—I’ve indicated some emergent, macro-level features), other (emergent) kinds of 3-fold modeling can be isomorphically connected to the expansive trope of givenness, enacting, and fulfillment. But to self representation, such kinds of 3-fold (which express a 2-fold difference: (a) difference between motivating givenness and motivated enacting; (b) enacting and fulfilled act) look like the 2-fold framing I began with: expressing/acting and enacted result; I-ing/moving and “I”/movement, because self-representation is oriented by understanding itself in distinction from outerworldness (as if givenness is marginal to being oneself). As such, the I/me difference is psychal; to others, it’s just me. Yet, really I’m being in/of the world (inworldness), yet an ontogenic, temporal synergy of givenness and enactivity (including the fractalic feature of enactive interest and enacting itself in enactivity), which transcends any given situation (or relationship) and whose self representation (“I”) is relative to enacted results (be-ing in/of the world) fulfilled. “I” is a future-oriented legacy of living (having lived for more to live), as if transcending all that’s given. (The awful extreme of this is egoism.)

11 | This I (given-enacting) / me (enacted act or represented acting) difference is the axis of an evidence-based approach to self-and-personality development (Damon & Hart, 1989) which I’ve found highly corroborated over the years. Also, the G-E-F trope is corroborated by other work: Two clinical psychologists have an outstanding (and well-selling) book on love (Mapping the Terrain of the Heart, 1998) which understands falling in love as erotic involvement (:G), capacity for idealization (:E), and capacity for merging (:F). Their sense of love itself is a process more than a state: being in Love (:G), deepening Love (:E), and being a couple (:F). Yet, that’s fractalic, as sustainable being in Love depends on deepening Love, sustainable deepening Love depends on being in Love, and sustainably being a couple depends on deepening Love.

12 | The leading theory of creativity is in terms of “domains” of expertise (:G), individuated “talent” (:E) and “field” promise of appreciation or recognition. But that’s fractalic, too, as given expertise depends on high individuation; persistent individuation depends on given talent; and fulfilling success depends on given, shared values.

13 | One might think that the so-called fractalness in time of the 3-fold is just a self-undermining of itself, as every mode applies to the development of every other. This isn’t the case, as the axial trope of mind and self (both empirically research-based) is structurally discrete. The necessarily-temporal result (:F) of growing (:E) in light of all this (:G), like mathematical fractals, causes recursive profusions of patterns containing and potentially mirroring each other.

14 | Sternberg himself finds the trope generalizable: He theorizes love as a synergy of passion (:G), commitment (:E), and intimacy (:F). The mind, to Sternberg, is like a government (or: government can be understood as systemized mind): judicial or appreciative (:G), legislative or creative (:E), and executive or implementive (:F). Of course, executive could be considered enactive relative to legislation considered given. And judiciousness could be considered fulfilling. Actually, a judicial mode of action is dependent on a given body of values (primarily appreciative of tradition or precedent), though it fulfills a question of the efficacy of action (fulfillment of intentions, compliance of results, etc.). Governmentally, an executive fulfills acts of law (and is normally presumed to evaluate its own result without judicial review).

15 | It all gets easily confusing, but a scale of modeling is exemplified (and can be explicated in more detail). The appropriateness of a degree of modeling depends on the situation called for (:G) and the interest (:G, yet :E) in modeling (:E) for particular purposes (relatively given, but actualized to fulfillment).

16 | Isomorphic rendering has lots of potential appreciating scales of comprehensibility, especially when there is a strongly evidence-based character of axial (or generative) conception. What kind of appeal can’t be usefully understood relative to its meaningfulness (:G), fruitfulness (:E), and validity (:F)? Can all communicative action be usefully identified as either disclosive (re: G), purposive (re: E), or appropriative (re: F)? Those questions touch pathways of modeling which might be very fruitful, even as clarification of a model limits.

17 | Consider the G-E-F triad as a lateral or horizontal model, then consider the above vertically, mapping a kind of model across kinds of consideration (modes of givenness across a scale of phenomenal landscape; modes of enactivity, modes of fulfillment). A high resonance of isomorphism can be very evocative. In my brief discussion, I’ve only vaguely associated the model with learning, intelligence, self development, love, and communication. I could carry on more. Frametime is Janus-faced: expansive, as well as instilling.

18 | The simple point is that modeling can be an expansively constructive, an exuberant endeavor, inspiring all kinds of interrelationships that can draw inquiry on. Having an axis that’s evidence-based but oozing with trOpical potential is luscious. Playing with possibilities is how understanding grows.

19 | A theoretical point to take from all this is a discernible sense in which a mind’s or psyche’s self formation of selformativity (I like) isn’t linguistically constituted. A developing mind is not like implementing a grammar. That’s a technical point, but the human sciences throughout most of the 20th C sought to make linguistic understanding constitutive. But this was undone by cognitive science, which now, in short, frames linguisticality in the temporality of mental development. This might seem to undermine my cherished interest in literary sense, which is so much about textuality. But anything can be text (i.e., calling for interpretation, mediation, or translation relative to implicit background, etc). My interest in textuality relies on this medium, but reality’s obviously more than the linguistic language that can be so evocative. Though the grammar of mind is more than linguistic, that (ironically) is why language can be so evocative: Text plays into the whole spectrum of intelligence: bodily-kinesthetic, intrapersonal, spatial, interpersonal, linguistic, logical-mathematical, and musical. (Those categories of intelligence are Howard Gardner’s distinctions in this theory of multiple intelligences; my sequencing.) We weave all these modes through extended time to find our psychal condition represented by a good sense of self with others in the world.

20 | A resonance of experience—a situation, a scene, another self “in person,” or anything else—has a background (be it depth or height, futurity or legacy) self-differentiating the moment as the situation, the scene, other, or thing there, “here” to itself (as if the thing could say), (t)here between us, as if phenomenality evinces each way, like breathing, inner complementing outer, necessary (given), active, and suspiring together “endlessly”: enacting the act, I-ing me, capturing potentials (implicatures) and specificity.

21 | Translation—like all textuality—is expansive, as well as mediative; and belongs to everything. When a photo is thought to speak for itself, its appeal may be way beyond its bounded surface, translating implied potential or mystery into a discrete calling for memorable imagination in perception.