conceptuality of enaction • gary e. davis • berkeley


	Area	good_ life

	conceptuality of enaction gary e. davis	January 26, 2019

A thriving life—beyond the inestimable variety of growths and flowerings of any and all healthy life—shows intelligence through intentionality, which can be better than goal-oriented (which all animal life is, hardwired and relatively not). Human intelligence can be project-oriented or project-ive (to a degree that no other animal can imagine). Human intentionality can be retrojectively found to be intrinsic animal nature, yet anticipates prospects that are self-created (ex nihilo, in a sense). The selformativity of human intelligence is in charge of its own “nature.”

For futural project-iveness, presents are regarded (enframed) in light of futural interest, which is integral to temporality: Action is oriented by appellant prospects, by possible actualization of realized interests.

That is even troped by simple perception, which always sees as (even when inaccurately) because the value of anticipated coherence is intrinsic [reference available]. Coherence is prospected before being established, even in immediately-accurate perception, because phenomenality is always construed as. In this sense , there’s no is; everything’s as (or: enframing marks are often apt for “is,” too).

Accordingly, habitual frames of interpretation have life-oriented normative efficacy, relative to interpretive reliabilities that become standard for one’s ongoing and unprecedented interests.

The primary norms of life serve ordinary interests of action. Normative fidelities serve the project-ive interests of a temporal lifeworld. Derivatively, norms of-and-for interpersonal interaction are made (or found to be) important because interpersonal interests serve preceding project-ive interest in orientation and reliability of one’s own time. The appeal of interpersonal normativity arises from interests of action, not primarily from need for interpersonal coodination (contrary to Habermas and sociocentric action theorists and moral theorists).

Being “purposively rational” as evaluable relative to the project-ive interests of a one’s life. The prevailing telicness of action as reasonable relative to its purposiveness. Fidelity to being purposively rational as a normative fidelity: being reasonably purposive, relative to one’s project-ive life.

(What have I lost there by not using ‘is’ in those sentences? Nothing but a disposition of positing that isn’t necessary for conveying definite sense.)

In light of futural orientation, one’s past is retrojectively formulated, as needed or as desired, which is always supplemental to project-ive interest.

The entirety of paragraphs above is an elaborative explication of a short note I made to myself one day:

The prevailing telicness of action (correlate with coherence/predictive value in perception (see Andy Clark, [citation]) is “purposively rational” in the sense that its normative fidelities serve the project-ive interests of a temporal lifeworld, i.e., a present in light of futural orientation by which its past is “written” and supplemental.

(Having thousands of notes in semantically-compressed idiom—spanning hundreds of themes and topics—probably portends that I’ll never explicate most of what I’ve written.)

My main interest here is just to set a point of entry for analytical work with others’ conceptions of action (e.g., Michael Bratman’s important “planning theory” of basic action).

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