Area	appropriativity

	deontic value gary e. davis	January 2019 / December 2023

‘Deontic’ derives from Greek deon: “that which is obligatory, from... dein to lack, be needful” (M-W Unabridged). We find the root commonly echoed in the idiom “You need to...” which oddly stands for “You should.” I’ve long found that confusion of should with need humorous, as if the speaker is regarding the listener as a child. Of course, others should make their better sense available, for the good of oneself and for the “good of the order.” I recommend (and do, myself) prefer to say “You should need to...” It is the case that necessity requires, thus imperative that... We can easily make sense of differences between standards for one’s life (selfidentically-orienting values) and standards for interpersonal life (normally called “social” and “normative”). But the difference is a living thing. Again, I like that Michael Bratman’s conception of action is in terms of “policies” serving activity which is oriented by plan. Policies which one adopts for the project-ivity of life (horizoned by the A-Project-ivity of lifelong caring for how and where one’s life is going) have oriental value (or life-relative “normative” worth). The degree to which one’s orientations should be revised relative to external norms (imposed, compelled) may be an ongoing, open issue for one’s life, not requiring that others compel upon one’s life a flexibility which is already appealing and ongoing—and fidelities which are integral to selfidentity. In both modes—action-oriental values and social norms—there’s vital difference between [a] standards which enable (facilitative standards, which I call “enablative”—others might call “permissive,” but that’s misleading for what I mean: self improving, not mere license); and [b] standards which protect (or prohibit). We desire enablative culture, but need to be protected from, say, predatory duplicity. Another important difference is [1] orientation by a prevailing standard (over- riding other relevant standards); and [2] conformance with a standard for the sake of externalist compliance, which may be good—e.g., professional ethics—or bad: strict paternalism. On the one hand, seeking through directive statements conformance with a valid structure (view, analysis, normativity)—which critique commonly does—is a kind of deontic structuralism. On the other hand, seeking through directives to enable engagement with a process (way of thinking, prospectiveness, high valuing)— which 3(2) pragmatism does—may be developmental (ideally: good_). Good reason may back systematic policies that include deontic conformances. Though tendencies toward axiomaticity (logocentrism) of action systems serve administrative efficiency, administration should be a balance between leadership (enablative) and managment. There is no good reason for strict paternalism in administration, except relative to high risk, critical (vital) points, or crisis. However, directives should be effective because they’re appealing, not by com- pulsion. One can enjoy being considerately oriented by rules which the person truly cares about. Directives backed by law may be welcomed, when validly instituted, in terms of high values that are appreciated and orientally accepted by those who are affected. But directives are never justifiable by instilling fear. The implicit continuum of attention above—from a pragmatism to law—involves no mention of “morality.” I would argue (and did argue in detail, years ago) that “morality”—when proffered as distinct from ethics (i.e., not a synonym for ethicality)—is policy of legislated ethics; i.e., an ethical policy is directive by law (or law-likeness in authority). But the anthropology of “moral”understanding extends into the mysticism of law among illiterate peoples, divinized entitlements of pyramidal dynasties, entitle- ments of estate, morés of “good” society, etc. Dissecting the manifold senses of the ordinary terms ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ shows much cultural diversity about ethical life as warranted by “law.” Indeed, deontological ethics for professional philosophy looks very much like philosophy of law. (That “ethics” article was written by specialists on law.) So, I regard ‘moral’ to mean: action-orienting appeal of deontic value. Morality is ethicality which is regarded to have the stature of valid legislation of value as directive norm entailing penalty for non-compliance.

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Be fair. © 2019, gary e. davis